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DOES UKRAINE NEED A COMPREHENSIVE 
STATUTE TO “CONTROL” PRIVATE DATA 
CONTROLLERS? 
OLENA DMYTRENKO* 
CARA D. CUTLER** 
ABSTRACT 
 This Article considers whether a European Union model of data 
protection, predominately in the form of a comprehensive statute, or 
a U.S. model of data protection, favoring industry self-regulation 
enhanced by sectoral legislation, would be best for Ukraine. This 
Article argues that a comprehensive statute may fit more easily into 
Ukraine’s civil law culture and may prove to be a requirement 
necessary for the country to obtain its goal of accession to the 
European Union. However, until Ukraine builds a strong 
democratic legacy, a rapid transplant of the European Union-style 
comprehensive statute may be detrimental to nurturing nascent 
private businesses and independent media. The Article argues that 
Ukraine’s short-term success demands adoption of a self-regulatory 
model akin to that of the United States for the time being. At the 
same time, slow steps should be taken to begin assessing whether or 
not implementation of a comprehensive statute in the future will suit 
Ukraine’s long-term needs. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Western civilization altered social interactions in the twentieth century 
simultaneously in two opposing directions. On the one hand, humankind 
developed sophisticated technology for collecting, compiling, analyzing, 
and sharing information about people. On the other hand, people 
increasingly grew to respect human individuality and independent mental 
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experimentation, which inevitably led to shared acknowledgement of a 
right to be left alone.  
Technological advances triggered public concern about individual 
privacy and demanded that legal systems respond by creating means to 
protect personal data, information related to identified or identifiable 
individuals.1 Not only national legal systems, but also the global 
international community, reacted to the new challenge by adopting 
relevant legal instruments. The 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights2 and the 1950 Council of Europe Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) 
recognized privacy as a fundamental human right.3 In the 1960s, the right 
to privacy began to be given explicit protection in the United States, 
through the Supreme Court’s decisions in Mapp v. Ohio4 and Griswold v. 
Connecticut.5 In 1980, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), with the world’s thirty largest economies signing 
on as members, adopted the Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data.6 The Guidelines’ objective is to 
reconcile the fundamental but competing values such as privacy and the 
free flow of information.7 The following year, the Council of Europe 
followed suit by enacting the Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data.8  
While the twentieth century brought the recognition of a fundamental 
right to privacy to both the United States and the European Union, the two 
developed distinct approaches to protecting this right. To prevent these 
differences from impeding the transatlantic information flow, the two 
 1. See, e.g., Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 
Recommendation Concerning And Guidelines Governing The Protection of Privacy And Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(80)58(Final) (Oct. 1, 1980), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited 
Jan. 5, 2006) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]. 
 2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. 
mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
 3. Eur. Consult. Ass. [ECHR], Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, GETS No. 005, art. 8 (Nov. 4, 1950), available at http://conventions.coe.int/ 
Treaty/er/Treaties/Html/005.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2006). 
 4. 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (stating that the Fourth Amendment creates “right to privacy, no 
less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people”). 
 5. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding that the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments 
each provide certain rights or guarantees and that these “various guarantees create zones of privacy”). 
 6. OECD Guidelines, supra note 1. 
 7. Id. pmbl. 
 8. Eur. Consult. Ass., Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, Doc. No. 108 (Jan. 28, 1981), available at http://convention.coe.nt/ 
Treaty/er/Treaties/Html/108.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2006) [hereinafter COE Convention]. 
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sides began to engage in a safe harbor arrangement. A safe harbor 
arrangement was necessary for both the United States and the EU because 
“the United States and the European Union share the goal of enhancing 
privacy protection for their citizens, [but] the United States takes a 
different approach to privacy from that taken by the European Union.”9 
The U.S. approach to protection of privacy relies on the philosophy that 
regulation of private data controllers is based on protecting personal 
information as a valuable asset and, by default, relies on market self-
regulation.10 By contrast, the EU treats data protection as a fundamental, 
universal human right and advocates an “omnibus”11 proactive statute for 
regulating private controllers.  
Ukraine was essentially immune from the data protection issues facing 
the EU and the United States until its independence in 1991. Faced with 
independence, Ukraine abandoned the coziness of the Iron Curtain in 
exchange for freedom. However, its legal system was caught naked and 
unprepared. The country proclaimed a policy of furthering a western-style 
democracy, with a western-style legal system12 for integration into the 
world economy.13 
The free market economy, liberalized information flows, computer 
technology, and human rights protection rushed rapidly and forcefully into 
Ukraine. Along with these changes, as in the EU and the United States, 
Ukraine was faced with the task of determining how its legal system 
should protect personal data from misuse by private controllers. The 
choice arises between providing centralized involvement of the 
 9. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SAFE HARBOR PRINCIPLES (July 21, 2000), available at 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SHPRINCIPLEFINAL.htm. 
 10. James P. Nefh, Incomparability and the Passive Virtues of Ad Hoc Privacy Policy, 76 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005). Nefh states: 
By doing little to regulate information privacy outside government agencies, Congress 
defaulted to a voluntary, market-oriented model that relied on individual self-policing as the 
dominant means of information control, supplemented in later years by state laws and federal 
sector-specific legislation. Proposals for a federal “privacy board” that would oversee a 
national policy, for example, were rejected . . . . To this day, information privacy in the 
United States relies heavily on individuals guarding the integrity of their data records and 
protecting personal information from unintended use. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 11. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 687 (Aspen 
Publishers 2003). 
 12. Anna M. Kuzmik, Rule of Law and Legal Reform in Ukraine, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 611, 611 
(1993) (“[O]ne of the central themes of reform has been the transition from a socialist legal regime, to 
a regime based on the western concept of ‘rule of law.’”). 
 13. KONSTITUTSIJA UKRAJINY [Ukr. Constitution]. See Official English Translation of the 
Constitution of Ukraine, available at http://www.rada.kiev.ua/const (last visited Jan. 5, 2006) 
[hereinafter UKR. CONST.]. 
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government through a comprehensive data-protection statute, as the EU 
does, and leaving the matter largely to self-regulation between private 
parties, as in the United States. 
Currently, Ukraine is at a fork in the decision-making road. This 
Article explores the issue, suggests a suitable short term solution for 
Ukraine, and stresses the importance of avoiding premature 
implementation of a data-protection statute. Why is the question of a 
comprehensive statute on protecting data from private controllers so 
critical for Ukraine today? This question is resolved differently in two 
contrasting legal orders: the statutory order of the EU and the self-
regulatory order of the United States. Each has strengths and weaknesses, 
and this paper discusses which approach is more appropriate for Ukraine. 
II. DATA PROTECTION IN UKRAINE 
A. Ukraine Within the Soviet Union 
When Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union, the question of controlling 
private data protection was not one for a legal system at all. The country 
was engaged in building communism, and, as part of this process, it 
possessed the long-term goal of abandoning law altogether.14 Communist 
ideology deems law a tool necessary only in antagonistic, imperfect 
societies.15 However, during its transition to true communism, while 
Soviet society was still somewhat imperfect, use of law was felt to be 
acceptable for the short term.  
It would be unfair to say that law offered no protection to personal 
data. The USSR Constitution established that “[t]he privacy of citizens, 
and of their correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraphic 
communications is protected by law.”16 However, this was not a 
constitutional privacy right in a western sense. Students learned that 
constitutional and legal norms were different. Legal norms had direct 
effect, so they could be realized by an application to a set of facts. 
Constitutional norms were realized through application of a statute. The 
statute projected them into legal norms, which would be of direct effect.17 
 14. Kuzmik, supra note 12, at 611. 
 15. A. ARZHANOV ET AL., TEORIJA GOSUDARSTVA I PRAVA [THEORY OF STATE AND LAW] 494 
(1949) (author’s trans.) (on file with author). 
 16. KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1977) [Konst. SSSR] [USSR Constitution] art. 56 (U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce, Office of General Counsel trans., 1995) [hereinafter USSR CONST.]. 
 17. See, e.g., S.I. RUSINOVA & V.A. R’ANZHIN, SOVETSKOJE KONSTITUTSIONNOJE PRAVO 
[SOVIET CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 16–17 (1975) (author’s trans.) (on file with author). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss1/3
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Judges were not allowed to interpret constitutional norms directly in 
litigation; this could lead to a lack of uniform application. Textbooks 
taught:  
[The] [p]olitical system of the Soviet society does not know such 
source of law as judicial precedence, which so easily leads to 
deviations from the foundations of legality and undermines the role 
of representative bodies of the state in legislative activity. In the 
Soviet State, the judicial bodies realize justice as one of the forms of 
application of law not connected with lawmaking.18 
Similarly, unlike in the EU and the United States, concern about data 
protection was not stirred by a popular use of technology. Prior to 
independence, home telephones and computers were scarce. Upon 
independence, Ukraine inherited an antiquated phone system, with less 
than five percent of the rural population having access to home 
telephones,19 and more than 3.5 million applications for telephone 
installation outstanding for years.20  
Moreover, there were no private parties to misuse personal 
information. The word “private” itself was taboo. Even the Civil Code, the 
last bastion of quasi-private law, which was needed to govern “property-
related and connected non-property-related relations for creation of 
material and technical foundation for communism,”21 openly despised the 
term “private.” The Code recognized citizens’ rights to possess, use, and 
dispose of certain items at their discretion.22 However, this was considered 
personal, rather than private property. In a centralized, planned economy 
there were no private businesses to take people’s personal information and 
use it for their own purposes. There were no private journalists to pry into 
people’s personal lives to earn some dirty money; all business and media 
were state-owned.  
Finally, the notion of individuals having private information was 
contrary to Soviet communist ideology. The preamble to the USSR 
Constitution established that “[t]he law of life is the care of all about the 
 18. S.N. BRATUS’ & I.S. SAMOSCHENKO, OBSCHAJA TEORIJA SOVETSKOGO PRAVA [GENERAL 
THEORY OF THE SOVIET LAW] 136 (1966) (author’s trans.) (on file with author). 
 19. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME (UNDP), 9 UNDP REPORT, E-READINESS ASSESSMENT OF 
UKRAINE 2002 [hereinafter UNDP REPORT]. 
 20. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), THE WORLD FACTBOOK 561 (2005). 
 21. Tsyvil’nyj Kodeks URSR [Civil Code of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic] (1963) art. 
1 (author’s trans.) (on file with author) [hereinafter Ukr. Civ. Code]. 
 22. Id. art. 88 (repealed by Law No. 3718-12 of Dec. 16, 1993). 
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welfare of each, and the care of each about the welfare of all.”23 Under this 
principle, no members of society had to hide anything from others. It was 
admitted that irresponsible individuals could gossip and distort personality 
profiles and newspapers, which would create mistakes in interpreting the 
facts. For such occurrences the civil code provided an article on 
defamation, which required the publishers to retract and rectify incorrect 
data.24 In addition, the criminal code threatened prosecution for libel25 and 
insult.26 
Implementing legal regimes to protect personal data from private 
controllers was not a goal of the Soviet Ukraine. However, upon attaining 
independence in 1991, the political winds changed and the protection of 
privacy became a hot issue. 
B. After the Fall of the Soviet Union 
When Ukraine became independent, several developments turned 
privacy rights and private data controllers into hot issues. These 
developments included liberalized conditions for private collection of 
personal data, a switch to a western-style human rights protection 
approach, and initiation of a course toward integrating into the European 
community. 
The reforms made it economically and technologically possible for 
private actors to collect personal data. Soon after proclaiming 
independence, Ukraine adopted a series of laws on capitalization and 
privatization of the economy. For example, in 1991 it promulgated the 
Law on Property,27 Law on Enterprises,28 and Law on Business 
Associations.29 These instruments restored the concept of private property 
in mainstream legal use and created a framework for the development of 
private businesses. In 1992, the Law on Information30 liberalized 
information flows. This law provided that “all citizens of Ukraine, 
 23. USSR CONST. pmbl. 
 24. Ukr. Civ. Code art. 7. 
 25. Kryminal’nyj Kodeks URSR [Criminal Code of Soviet Ukraine] #2001-V, art. 125 (Dec. 28, 
1960) (author’s trans.) (on file with author). 
 26. Id. art. 126. 
 27. Zakon Ukrajiny pro Vlasnist [Law of Ukraine on Property], #697–XII (Feb. 7, 1991) 
(author’s trans.) (on file with author). 
 28. Zakon Ukrajiny pro Pidpryjemstva [Law of Ukraine on Enterprises], #887-XII (Mar. 27, 
1991) (author’s trans.) (on file with author). 
 29. Zakon Ukrajiny pro Hospodars’ki Tovarystvai [Law of Ukraine on Business Organizations], 
#1576-XII (Sept. 19, 1991) (author’s trans.) (on file with author). 
 30. Zakon Ukrajiny pro Informatsiju [Law of Ukraine on Information] #2657-XII (Oct. 2, 1992) 
(author’s trans.) (on file with author) [hereinafter Law on Information]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss1/3
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juridical persons, and state agencies have the right to information, which 
denotes the ability to freely acquire, use, spread, and store information.”31 
The subsequent Law on the Press,32 Law on Television and Radio-
broadcasting,33 and Law on Information Agencies34 established baselines 
for the functioning of private media. By 2001, almost eighty percent of the 
newspapers and a majority of telecommunication stations were privately 
owned.35 In addition, the legal system closely addressed the issue of 
technology development. The 1998 national concept of “informatization” 
endorsed “creation, development, and utilization of information 
technologies [for the purposes] of . . . further democratization . . . and 
facilitation of equitable integration of Ukraine into the international 
community.” 36 
The existing infrastructure for technology development still 
substantially lags behind that of the EU and the United States. However, 
the recent United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) E-
Readiness Assessment for Ukraine has indicated that Ukraine’s potential is 
immense.37 With its 15,000 annual graduates who have information 
technology as a component of their university studies,38 Ukraine has been 
fourth in the world in the number of certified information technology 
professionals.39 In 2001, an estimated 370,000 to 400,000 personal 
computers were sold in the Ukrainian market,40 representing an annual 
 31. Id. art. 9. 
 32. Zakon Ukraijiny pro Drukovani Zasoby Masovoji Informatsiji (Presu) v Ukrajini [Law of 
Ukraine on Printed Media in Ukraine] #2782-XII (Nov. 16, 1992) (author’s trans.) (on file with 
author). 
 33. Zakon Ukrajiny pro Telebachenn’a I Radiomovlenn’a [Law of Ukraine on Television and 
Radio-Broadcasting] #3759-XII (Dec. 21, 1993) (author’s trans.) (on file with author). 
 34. Zakon Ukrajiny pro Informatsijni Ahenstva [Law of Ukraine on Information Agencies] 
#74/95-ВР (Feb. 28, 1995) (author’s trans.) (on file with author). See also J.A. FLEJSHITS, LICHNYJE 
PRAVA V GRAZHDANSKAM PRAVE SOJUZA SSRI KAPITALICHESKIH STRAN [PERSONAL RIGHTS IN 
CIVIL LAW OF THE USSR AND CAPITALISTIC STATES] 101 (Yurizdat NKYu USSR 1941) (author’s 
trans.) (on file with author). 
 35. KHARKIV HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP (KHRG), OHL’AD POVIDOMLEN’ PRO KONFLIKTY V 
INFORMATSIJNIJ SFERI [OVERVIEW OF PUBLICATIONS ABOUT CONFLICTS IN THE SPHERE OF 
INFORMATION] (Kharkiv 2001) (author’s trans.) (on file with author); 2 SVOBODA VYRAZHENN’A 
POHL’ADIV [FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION OF VIEWS] 24(65) (2002); quoting 58 NARODNA ARMIJA 3 
(Mar. 28, 2001)) [hereinafter KHRG] (author’s trans.) (on file with author). 
 36. Zakon Ukrajiny pro Kontseptsiju Natsional’noji Prohramy Informatyzatsiji [Law of Ukraine 
on Concept of National Program of Informatization] #75/98-BP (Feb. 4, 1998) (author’s trans.) (on file 
with author). 
 37. UNDP REPORT, supra note 19, at intro. 
 38. Id. at 36. 
 39. Emmy B. Gengler, Ukraine and Success Criteria for the Software Exports Industry, 13 EC. J. 
INFO. SYS. DEV. COUNTRIES, 8, 9 (2003), available at http://new.ejisdc.org/ojs/include/getdoc.php? 
id=82&article=93&mode=pdf. 
 40. UNDP REPORT, supra note 19, at 39. 
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growth rate of seventeen to twenty-two percent.41 The mobile (cellular) 
phone market has experienced unprecedented growth of just under 200 
percent a year, acquiring two and a half million users by 2002.42 The 
market for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) became unlicensed, 
expanding from 100 providers in 1997 to more than 300 by 2002.43 The 
number of Internet users has grown from only 400 people in 1993 to 
900,000 people in 2002.44  
This technological growth has had pros and cons. Economic and 
technological developments made it possible for private actors to acquire 
wide access to personal data. However, the government instantaneously 
acquired an obligation to regulate such access, because promotion of 
western-style protection of human rights in Ukraine, including the right to 
privacy, became a high priority of the government after independence.  
It should be noted that Ukraine originally incorporated a human rights 
agenda into its lawmaking before independence. In 1990, the Verkhovna 
Rada (National Legislature) promulgated the Declaration of Sovereignty, 
which expressed the nation’s will to create a state-based rule of law with 
comprehensive safeguards for human rights and freedoms.45 In 1996, 
Ukraine’s new Constitution expanded this aspiration, providing that: “the 
human being, his or her life and health, honor and dignity, inviolability 
and security are recognized in Ukraine as the highest social value. Human 
rights and freedoms and their guarantees determine the essence and 
orientation of the activity of the State.”46 
Article 23 of the new Constitution offers general recognition of the 
right of privacy by stipulating that “every person has the right to free 
development of his or her personality. . . .”47 Article 31 protects the 
privacy of mail, telephone conversations, telegraph, and other 
correspondence.48 Article 32 outlaws interference with personal and family 
life; forbids the collection, storage, use, and dissemination of confidential 
information about a person without his or her consent; and entitles 
individuals to examine information collected about them, as well as rectify 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 10. 
 43. Id. at 14. 
 44. U.N.S. Div., Millenium Indicators: Country Profiles, at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi.asp? 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2006). 
 45. Deklaratsija pro Derzhavnyj Suverenitet Ukrajiny [Declaration on the Sovereignty of 
Ukraine] #55-XII (July 16, 1990) (author’s trans.) (on file with author). 
 46. UKR. CONST. art. 3. 
 47. Id. art. 23. 
 48. Id. art. 31. 
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incorrect information or demand its expulsion.49 Unlike the USSR 
Constitution, the Constitution of Ukraine was adopted as a piece of 
directly enforceable law.50 The Ukraine Constitution proclaims an 
individual’s right to appeal any constitutional violation in a national court 
before the National Human Rights Commissioner.51 The Constitution 
further states that upon exhaustion of all domestic remedies, an individual 
may seek protection from the international community.52  
In addition to internal economic and political developments demanding 
that the State ensure data protection against misuse by private controllers, 
Ukraine adopted several international obligations urging the government 
to shape the local data protection framework within the course of global 
standards. 
Ukraine has articulated a desire to integrate into the European Union. 
Presidential Ukaz (Edict) # 615/98 of June 11, 1998 endorsed the strategy 
of integration. This strategy established priorities such as the 
harmonization of human rights frameworks and legislation on information 
and communications technologies.53 In 1997, Ukraine ratified the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and recognized the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights over its territory.54 
New social and political conditions required the national legal system to 
address privacy of personal data as an ultimate concern. 
C. Current Mechanisms for “Controlling” Private Controllers in 
Ukraine: Why Long for a New Statute? 
In order to fulfill its new data protection obligations, Ukraine has taken 
a number of legislative steps. The first mention of the term “personal data” 
predates the Constitution and traces back to the 1992 Law on 
Information.55 Article 23 of this law defined the basic term “personal data” 
(personal’ni dani) as information regarding “nationality, education, family 
 49. Id. art. 32. 
 50. Id. art. 8. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. art. 55. 
 53. Ukaz Presidenta Ukrainy [Edict of the President of Ukraine] #615/98 (June 11, 1998) “On 
Strategy of Integration into the European Union,” § 1, available at http://ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/ 
eu/en/publication/content/1992.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2006). 
 54. Zakon Ukrajiny pro Ratyfikatsiju Konventsiji pro Zakhyst Prav i Osnovnykh Svobod 
L’udyny 1950, Pershoho Protocolu i Protocoliv # 2, 4, 7 ta 11 do Konventsiju [Law of Ukraine on 
Ratification of Convention on Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, of 
First Protocol and Protocols # 2, 4, 7, and 11 to the Convention] #475/97-ВР (July 17, 1997) (author’s 
trans.) (on file with author). 
 55. Law on Information, supra note 30. 
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status, religious beliefs, health status, as well as address, date and place of 
birth.”56 It then placed this term within a broader concept of information 
about a person, which was defined as “entirety of documented or publicly 
announced notions (information, knowledge) about a person.”57 The Law 
on Information specifically restricted dissemination of certain categories 
of sensitive data, such as “information about health (medical secrets), 
financial deposits, profits from entrepreneurship, adoption, 
correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraph transmissions.”58 
The law also established basic principles of handling information about a 
person. It bans collection of personal information without the subject’s 
prior consent (except when expressly authorized by the statute).59 It also 
urges for collection and storage to be strictly limited and used only for a 
lawfully established purpose; it restricts third persons from accessing 
information about another collected by state authorities, organizations, and 
officials; and it requires all organizations that collect information about 
citizens to register their respective databases with the state.60 Under the 
law, subjects are entitled both to know at the time of collection what 
information is being collected and for what purpose,61 and also to access 
the information collected62 and check its accuracy, completeness, and 
relevance.63 Finally, the law introduced a private civil cause of action for 
damages inflicted by violation of the data subject’s rights.64 
In addition, the legislature addressed various aspects of handling 
sensitive personal information, in a variety of instruments that regulate the 
activities of certain types of private controllers. Some twenty acts contain 
provisions detailing collection, processing, and transfer of information 
about physical persons in various contexts.65 These include the Law on 
Notary,66 Law on Professional Advocacy,67 Law on Communication,68 
 56. Id. art. 23. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. art. 46. 
 59. Id. art. 23. 
 60. Id. art. 31. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. art. 23. 
 63. Id. art. 31. 
 64. Id. arts. 31, 44, 47, 49.  
 65. ALEXANDER A. BARANOV ET AL., PRAVA CHELOVEKA I ZASCHITA PERSONAL’NYKH 
DANNYKH [HUMAN RIGHTS AND PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA] 67 (2000) (author’s trans.) (on file 
with author). 
 66. Zakon Ukrajiny pro Notariat [Law of Ukraine on Notary], # 3425-XII (Sept. 2, 1993) 
(author’s trans.) (on file with author). 
 67. Zakon Ukrajiny pro Advokaturu [Law of Ukraine on Professional Advocacy], #2887-XII 
(Dec. 19, 1992) (author’s trans.) (on file with author). 
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Law on Militia,69 Law on Banks and Banking Activity,70 Law on 
Protection of Information in Automated Systems,71 and Law on Prevention 
of the Spread of AIDS and Social Protection of the Population.72  
Finally, the newly adopted Civil Code, which entered into force on 
January 1, 2004,73 provided a number of tools applicable to any context 
and allowed individuals to take steps to protect their private data against 
tortious harm.74 The Code provides redress for subjects of data collection 
in two ways. First, it explicitly secures a number of sectoral privacy-
related safeguards. Second, it enables an individual to assert and claim a 
violation of a personality (personal, non-property-related) right not 
enumerated in the Code.75 The sectoral safeguards provided by the Code 
include a right to privacy of one’s health status,76 personal life,77 personal 
papers,78 correspondence,79 and inviolability of business reputation.80 It 
enables individuals to control publicity of their image in photos, artistic 
pieces, and films.81 It pays special attention to the inviolability of one’s 
personal name.82  
Complementary to these aspectual safeguards, the Code allows much 
individual discretion in defining the content and scope of other rights 
relating to personal data. It establishes that the list of personality rights is 
non-exhaustive. As such, the Code offers general guidance, but does not 
provide an enumerated list of what constitutes a personality right. Pursuant 
 68. Zakon Ukrajiny pro Zv’jazok [Law of Ukraine on Communication] #160/95-BP (May 16, 
1995) (author’s trans.) (on file with author). 
 69. Zakon Ukrajiny pro Militsiju [Law of Ukraine on Militia] #565-XII (Dec. 20, 1990) (author’s 
trans.) (on file with author). 
 70. Zakon Ukrajiny pro Banky i Bankivs’ku Dijal’nist’ [Law of Ukraine on Banks and Banking 
Activity] # 872-XII (Mar. 20, 1991) (author’s trans.) (on file with author). 
 71. Zakon Ukrajiny pro Zakhyst Informatsiji v Avtomatyzovanykh Systemakh [Law of Ukraine 
on Protection of Information in Automated Systems] # 80/94-BP (July 5, 1994) (author’s trans.) (on 
file with author). This law primarily governs security standards for automated systems containing 
protected information and establishes the right of individuals and entities to cooperate with 
counterparts in other countries in processing, exchange, and trade of open information.  
 72. Zakon Ukrajiny pro Zapobihann’a Poshyrenn’u Zakhvor’uvann’a na SNID ta Sotsial’nyj 
Zakhyst Naselenn’a [Law of Ukraine on Prevention of the Spread of AIDS and Social Protection of 
the Population] (Dec. 12, 1991) (author’s trans.) (on file with author). 
 73. See generally Ukr. Civ. Code, supra note 21. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. art. 286. 
 76. Id. art. 301. 
 77. Id. art. 303. 
 78. Id. art. 306. 
 79. Id. art. 299. 
 80. Id. arts. 307–308. 
 81. Id. arts. 294–296.  
 82. Id. art. 270. 
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to article 269, personality rights are rights that (1) belong to each 
individual from birth or pursuant to the law, (2) do not have economic 
content, and (3) are so closely connected to the physical persons that their 
subjects may not voluntarily renounce them.83 Under the concept of 
personality rights, the new Civil Code enabled individuals to challenge 
actions of others based on so-called customized concepts.84 
In spite of the fact that a variety of legislative acts address data 
protection in this new setting, Ukrainian policymakers remain unsatisfied 
with the existing framework. European integration has brought with it the 
idea that a new comprehensive, uniform bill on data protection is needed 
to address the issue in its entirety. To this effect, the Verkhovna Rada has 
registered two bills: the Bill on Personal Character Information and the 
Bill on Protection of Personal Data.85 This second bill passed in its first 
reading on May 15, 2003.  
Overall, having completed a number of steps to ensure data protection 
in recent years, Ukraine is looking to take another step, opening a new era 
in treating the subject. A new comprehensive law on data protection is 
expected, in regards to dealing with private controllers, to clarify three 
intertwined but distinctly important issues. First, where does data 
protection belong in the macrostructure of other institutes of the legal 
system? Second, what should be the microstructure of definitions, 
principles, and rules of law? And finally, how should the interest in data 
protection correlate to the equally important interest in ensuring free 
information flows in a democratic society? 
In terms of the macrostructure, the statute is expected to enhance the 
public-law component of the data protection law and secure governmental 
enforcement and oversight. The euphoria regarding human rights in the 
1990s produced two opposing trends in approaching human rights 
enforcement. On the one hand, it inspired the creation of an entirely new 
chapter on personality rights in the 2004 Civil Code.86 Dr. Dovhert, a co-
author of the Code, wrote, “[n]orms that foster development of an 
individual as a personality must precede norms that foster her formation as 
an owner of property or a party to a contract.”87 Lawmakers agreed that 
 83. Id. art. 269. 
 84. See generally id. 
 85. Pro Informatsiju Personalinaho Harakteru [Bill on Personal Character Information] #2016 of 
July 22, 2002; both bills are available at http://ilaw.org.ua/list_bill.php (last visited Jan. 5, 2006). 
 86. Ukr. Civ. Code, at bk. II. 
 87. A. DOVHERT, KODYFIKATSIJA PRYVATNOHO (TSYVIL’NOHO) PRAVA UKRAJINY 
[CODIFICATION OF PRIVATE (CIVIL) LAW OF UKRAINE] 156 (2000) (author’s trans.) (on file with 
author). 
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predominantly Soviet-style public enforcement of constitutional rights was 
not sufficient. Administrative protection is restricted to violations of rights 
by the administrative bodies. Criminal liability depends upon the degree of 
guilt; the idea is to correct a violator by means of repression. Concern 
about restitution of the victim’s peace of mind, which has been ruined by 
the committed violation, is foreign to the criminal law. Meanwhile, due 
protection of personal rights requires safeguarding them from any 
infringement, regardless of who commits the infringement and whether 
she is at fault.88  
On the other hand, scholars opposed to introducing the concept of 
individual rights into the Civil Code have expressed a fear that private 
action may diminish or distort the constitutional meaning of fundamental 
rights. Dr. Znamenskij, for example, emphasized that the pathos of 
international human rights standards is in the hands of the state to 
protect.89 He theorized that the state may get too comfortable encouraging 
private enforcement and detach itself from an obligation to prosecute 
human rights violations by public means.90 With public enforcement 
(criminal and administrative), the state would share the victim’s burden for 
evidence collection. Moreover, public enforcement would condemn a 
violation on behalf of the entire nation and would demonstrate the 
violation’s incompatibility with the values of the society.91 
The current data protection framework provides baseline regulations 
for the conduct of private controllers and offers data subjects the ability to 
enforce the regulations through contractual clauses and tort litigation. 
However, if a controller does not comply with legal requirements or the 
demands of the subject, there is little public oversight capable of 
intervening on the subject’s behalf unless the subject takes private action. 
If data protection is a fundamental human right guaranteed by the 
Constitution, is it enough that the state provides only private enforcement? 
Would not the state run afoul of its constitutional obligation, allowing 
violations to happen if an individual, out of ignorance, business, or 
intimidation, refused to take a stand and go to court? To address these 
 88. Such reasoning was articulated by some Soviet scholars as early as 1940s, but it was 
disfavored. See, e.g., FLEJSHITS, supra note 34. 
 89. See Georgiy Znamenskyy, Khyby Knyhy II Proektu Tsivil’noho Kodeksu Ukrajiny 
[Shortcomings of Book II of the Draft Civil Code of Ukraine], 3 UKRAJINS’KE PRAVO [UKRAINIAN 
LAW] 122–15 (1997) (author’s trans.) (on file with author). 
 90. See id. 
 91. O.A. KRASAVCHIKOV, 1 SOVETSKOJE GRAZHDANSKOJE PRAVO [SOVIET CIVIL LAW] 423 
(1972) (author’s trans.) (on file with author). 
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fears, the Bill on the Protection of Personal Data envisions specialized 
National Data Protection Authorities (DPAs).92 
Another problem that the law is expected to address is the poor 
microstructure of the data protection institute, specifically the lack of 
organized rules and streamlined definitions. Because adoption of 
information-related legislation over the last ten years has been patchy and 
haphazard, there is a growing annoyance with terminological ambiguities 
and incongruity between rules. For example, analysts Bagraj and Kravtsov 
note that, while procedural aspects of the law are described in detail, the 
system of definitions is insufficiently developed and confusing.93 For 
instance, in some acts the term informatsija (information) itself is defined 
through the term svedenija (to know).94 Other acts instead define it 
through the term dani (data).95 A statute on data protection is seen as the 
fastest and most appropriate way to remove ambiguities by offering clear-
cut definitions of such baseline terms as “personal data,” “data controller,” 
“filing system,” and “data processing.” 
Another challenge of the current data protection system is finding a 
way to make modifications to the system without interrupting the flow of 
information. Article 23 of the Ukrainian Constitution establishes a general 
balancing principle that “[e]very person has the right to free development 
of his or her personality if the rights and freedoms of other persons are not 
violated thereby.”96 Further, article 32 of the Constitution bans “[t]he 
collection, storage, use and dissemination of confidential information 
about a person without . . . consent,” but at the same time provides an 
exception “in the interests of national security, economic welfare, and 
human rights.”97 Likewise, article 34, which secures the right to freedom 
of speech, explains that “everyone has the right to freely collect, store, use, 
and disseminate information.”98 It imposes an immediate restriction in the 
 92. Proekt Zakonu Ukrajiny pro Zakhyst Personal’nykh Danykh [Draft Law of Ukraine on 
Protection of Personal Data] #2618 of Jan. 10, 2003, art. 3 (author’s trans.) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Bill on Data Protection]. 
 93. V.V. Bagraj & H.A., Kravtsov, Analiz Zakonodatel’noj Bazy Ukraijiny v Sfere Zaschity 
Informatsiji [Analysis of the Legislative Framework of Ukraine in the Sphere of Protection of 
Information] 9, available at http://gipi.internews.ua/ukr/Public_ICT/Analitics/Obsor_LawArticle.doc 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2006) (author’s trans.). 
 94. Id. at 5. This term is from the Slavic term vedat. 
 95. Id. It is unclear how all these terms correlate with each other. 
 96. UKR. CONST. art. 23. 
 97. Id. art. 32. 
 98. Id. art 34. 
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interest of “[protecting] the reputation or rights of other persons” and 
“preventing the publication of information received confidentially . . . .”99 
The Soviet legacy may make Ukrainian courts reluctant to shape policy 
by fairly balancing and filling the gaps of the existing legislation. The 
tradition of looking to the legislature to define the precise scope of legal 
rights and duties is historically rooted. This is reflected, for instance, in the 
Constitutional Court’s 1997 ruling on the issue of data collection. In this 
ruling the Court, authorized to provide official interpretation of statutes 
and invalidate unconstitutional statutory provisions, reflected its deep 
frustration with statutory loopholes in the absence of clearly defined 
statutory language. The Court regretted that the statutory framework 
concerning information flow contains unclearly defined, colliding 
provisions and loopholes, which negatively affects enforcement of 
constitutional rights and freedoms of a human and a citizen[,] the law does 
not completely define the rules for collection, storage, utilization and 
dissemination of information.”100 
Under these conditions, a new statute is expected to prevent possible 
confusion among controllers, enforcement, and judges, ensuring 
uniformity in the application of concurring constitutional principles. Will 
the expectations of the Ukrainian policymakers come true? Is a new statute 
truly necessary? Will it advance the system of data protection? Within 
thirteen years of its independence, Ukraine has achieved amazing success 
in the setting of a framework for data protection. The need to create this 
framework, which took decades to evolve in western Europe and the 
United States, bypassed Ukraine until the 1990s. The country was busy 
building a society in which data protection law was believed to be 
unnecessary. As Ukraine is standing at a fork in the “decision-making 
road,” assessing the “pros” and “cons” of an omnibus statute, the next Part 
explores the existing data protection frameworks in the EU (with its 
comprehensive statutory protection) and the United States (with its market 
self-regulation and sectoral statutes). What is it the omnibus statute has 
given to Europeans that Americans do not have? And what do Americans 
gain by avoiding a comprehensive statute? 
III. TO HAVE OR NOT TO HAVE: WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS? 
In the late eighteenth century, the U.S. Constitution was inspired by the 
Enlightenment, embracing the idea that the state is a product of a social 
 99. Id. 
 100. In re Ustymenko, Opinion No. 18/203-97 (Ukr. Const. Ct. 1997). 
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contract. It was suggested that negative rights restricting the state from 
interfering with private affairs were the basis and foundation for freedom 
and pursuit of happiness. One such negative right, freedom of expression, 
was thought to be a watchdog of governmental accountability. In response 
to World War II, the 1950 European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) was drafted. Through the ECHR, Europeans declared a longing to 
restore human dignity and the essential right to personal inviolability.101 
How did the two philosophies affect data protection frameworks in terms 
of their micro and macro structures, and in terms of balancing with the free 
flow of information? 
A. General Overview of the EU and U.S. Data Protection Frameworks 
1. Data Protection in the EU 
The European framework for data protection is comprised of a whole 
orchestra of directives and recommendations of the European Union 
authorities, intertwined with data protection legislations of the member 
states. However, this orchestra follows its prime conductor, a single 
statutory instrument, the General Directive of the European Commission 
and the Council.  
The principle of subsidiarity, a fundamental concept of EU legislation, 
mandates that matters be solved at the lowest possible level.102 It also 
provides member states with significant discretion in setting national data 
protection frameworks. Inspired by the European Convention on Human 
Rights, many member states enacted laws on data protection by 2000.103 
Until recently, these laws differed considerably in structure, content, and 
approach.104 In spite of these variations, one can obtain a basic sense of 
how European data protection works through the study of the EU 
directives. The unique legal force of the directives gives them a special 
leading role in shaping the national law of member states. Directives bind 
member states, but only in regards to the results, leaving the processes and 
systems of implementation considerably up to national authorities.105 
 101. See, e.g., Marsha C. Huie et al., The Right to Privacy in Personal Data: The EU Prods the 
U.S. and Controversy Continues, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 391, 428 (2002). 
 102. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3, art. 5 
(consolidated version, art. 5, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C 325)) [hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
 103. European Commission, Status or Implementation of Directive 95/46 or the Protection of 
Individuals with Regent to the Processing of Personal Data, http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/ 
fsj/privacy/law/implementation_en.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Commission Report]. 
 104. CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PRIVACY LAW AND ONLINE BUSINESS 13 (2003). 
 105. GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 76 (2002). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss1/3
p 31 Dmytrenko Cutler book pages.doc 2/17/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] PRIVATE DATA CONTROL IN UKRAINE 47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, should a government fail to implement a directive promptly and 
properly, its nationals are entitled to refer directly to the directive and 
assert violation of their rights in court.106 
Several directives address data protection issues in the European 
Union. For example, the Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications governs data protection in telecommunications, faxes, e-
mail, the Internet, and other similar services.107 Basic rules applicable to 
online advertising have been harmonized through the Distance Selling108 
and the E-Commerce Directives.109 The EU Electronic Signatures 
Directive110 contains data protection rules for providing electronic 
signature services. However, all of these tools were adopted to supplement 
and solidify another comprehensive statutory instrument, the Directive on 
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Directive).111 It 
was adopted in 1995 to harmonize the divergent legislation of the member 
states by setting fundamental guidelines for both the public and private 
sectors,112 and, in a way, has become a constitution of European data 
protection.  
2. Data Protection in the United States 
U.S. data protection (or information privacy) law does not center 
around a single statute. It is better described as “an interrelated web of tort 
law, federal and state constitutional law, federal and state statutory law, 
evidentiary privileges, property law, contract law, and criminal law.”113  
 106. Id. at 76–80. 
 107. Council Directive 2002/58, Directive Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the 
Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC), available 
at http://europa.euint/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/1_201/1_2012002073/en00370047.pdf. 
 108. Council Directive 97/7, Directive on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance 
Contracts, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19 (EC), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/policy/ 
developments/dis_sell/dist01_en.pdf. 
 109. Council Directive 2001/31, Directive on Certain Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce in 
the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) (EC), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/em/oj/dat/ 
2000(1.178/1.17820000717en00010016.pdf. 
 110. Council Directive 1999/93, Directive on a Community Framework for Electronic Signatures, 
1999 O.J. (L 13) 12 (EC), available at http://europa.evint/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/1.013/ 
1.01320000119en00120020.pdf. 
 111. Council Directive 95/146, Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regent to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter 
General Directive]. See also KUNER, supra note 104, at 17. 
 112. Id. 
 113. SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 11, at 2. 
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Unlike the European Convention, the U.S. Constitution does not 
specifically mention privacy. Nevertheless, inspired by social demand for 
legal protection of the ability “to be let alone,”114 the Supreme Court found 
that the Constitution has certain “penumbras” or “zones of privacy.”115 For 
example, the First Amendment guards freedom of speech and at the same 
time secures a private right to speak anonymously. The Third Amendment 
protects the privacy of the home by preventing the government from 
allowing soldiers to reside in people’s homes. The Fourth Amendment 
provides that people have the right “to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”116 
Because there is no single constitutionally or statutorily defined right to 
privacy, non-governmental actors have considerable discretion in 
establishing or not establishing data protection practices. However, even in 
the absence of a statute, since the 1890 Warren and Brandeis article The 
Right to Privacy,117 U.S. courts have entertained actions for intrusions into 
the privacy of individuals. The common law practice has established four 
distinct “privacy torts”: “(1) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or 
solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing 
private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a 
false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation, for the defendant’s 
advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”118 
Toward the middle of the twentieth century, when technological 
advances allowed for unprecedented collection of personal information in 
databases, data protection became a defining social issue for American 
society.119 However, faithful to the approach of economy of state action, 
the legislature responded by creating privacy rights only in specific 
contexts. For instance, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA) restricted collection of personal data from children.120 The 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) required financial institutions to disclose 
their privacy policies and practices to consumers.121 The Health Insurance 
 114. The formulation of intuition about privacy as a right “to be let alone,” usually attributed to 
and extensively used by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in their article, traces back to earlier 
authors. Warren and Brandeis actually borrowed the quote from Thomas C. Cooley’s, Law of Torts 
(1880). For a correct citation see William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 115. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).  
 116. Id. 
 117. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 118. Prosser, supra note 114, at 389. 
 119. SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 11, at 22. 
 120. SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 11, at 561. See also Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 650 et. seq. (1998). 
 121. SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 11, at 534. See also Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. 
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Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) protects privacy of medical 
records.122 Apart from this “piecemeal legislation,” U.S. law “does not 
recognize any general right to control the collection and use of personal 
information.”123  
Which approach would be more appropriate for Ukraine, the European 
comprehensive statutory model or U.S. style self-regulation? Each 
framework presents valuable considerations. 
B. Macro-Structure of the Western Data Protection: A Fundamental 
Human Right or a Valuable Private Asset? 
In terms of the macro-structure, the need for a statute is predicated on a 
central question: how private is the right to information privacy? If it is a 
fundamental human right, the government may be able to justify a 
mandate to establish prophylactic statutory restrictions on private data 
controllers to prevent any abuse of the public value. On the other hand, if 
it is a private asset, prophylactic governmental interference in a 
democratic society may be excessive, and the government should abstain 
from regulation except, perhaps, to create a general private-law framework 
for fair dealings in contracts and fair compensation in torts. 
1. The Human Rights Approach and the Need for Public Enforcement 
From its very inception, EU culture has treasured privacy of personal 
data. Some commentators even compare the EU attitude towards personal 
information to the reverence for the integrity of the human body: no 
economic considerations can make a civilized legal system approve sale of 
human legs, arms, or heads.124 The current EU legal system derives from 
the European Economic Community (EEC), an organization established in 
1957 to advance four largely economic freedoms: the free movement of 
goods, people, services, and capital throughout the member states.125 The 
founding treaties conferred no legislative powers in the sphere of human 
§ 6801, et seq. (1999). 
 122. SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 11, at 210. See also Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg and 29 U.S.C. § 1181 et seq. (1996). While in many 
ways HIPAA protects privacy of medical records, it also includes many provisions that weaken 
privacy protection of such records. 
 123. RONALD J. MANN & JANE K. WINN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 129 (2002). 
 124. Lynn Kramer, Comment, Private Eyes Are Watching You: Consumer Online Privacy 
Protection-Lessons from Home and Abroad, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 387, 390 (2002). 
 125. EC Treaty, supra note 102, art. 3, § 1(c). 
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rights to the centralized bodies.126 However, with the evolution of the EEC 
into the Union, the human rights focus has become increasingly connected 
to all legal developments. The proposed EU Constitution states that that 
the European Union “[draws] inspiration from the cultural, religious, and 
humanist inheritance of Europe, the values of which . . . have embedded 
within the life of society the central role of the human person and his or 
her inviolable and inalienable rights. . . .”127 
It is notable that the Stauder case in 1969,128 the first case ever to raise 
human rights issues at the EEC level, was a data protection case. Stauder, 
an impoverished German national, contested the requirement that he 
identify himself in order to obtain coupons allowing him to purchase 
butter at a reduced fee. The European Court of Justice took this factually 
small but symbolically vital case seriously, ruling that “the Community’s 
measures should be set aside if they fall short to respect a fundamental 
human right.”129 
The human rights approach to the treatment of personal data justified 
creation of the General Directive as a central source for the EU law on 
information privacy. The Directive seeks to “protect the fundamental 
[right] of natural persons . . . to privacy with respect to the processing of 
personal data.”130 In accordance with the human rights approach, the 
government can restrict data flows a priori, whether the data subjects ask 
for the protection or not.131 As Reidenberg observes, the European vision 
of governance “generally regards the state as the necessary player to frame 
the social community in which individuals develop and in which 
information practices must serve individual identity. . . . Law thus 
enshrines prophylactic protection through comprehensive rights and 
responsibilities. Indeed, citizens trust government more than the private 
sector with personal information.”132 
 126. GEORGE BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 256 (2002) 
 127. The European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, July 18, 
2003, 820 Eur. Conv. 1. EU member states have set November 2006 as the deadline for ratification of 
the EU Constitution, and it is currently being considered for possible ratification by EU member states. 
Spain was the first member state to hold a national referendum on the EU Constitution, approving it in 
February 2005. “If fewer than twenty-five member states sign the EU Constitution, the proposed draft 
will undergo formal revisions.” French to Vote in May, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2005, at A5. As of 
November 24, 2005, twelve EU member states had ratified the treaty. EU Constitution: Where 
Members Stand, BBC NEWS.COM, Nov. 25, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3954327.stm (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2006). 
 128. Case 29/69, Erich Stauder v. City of Ulm, Sozialent, 1969 E.C.R. 419. 
 129. Id. 
 130. General Directive, supra note 111, art. 1, § 1. 
 131. Kramer, supra note 124, at 407. 
 132. Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 717, 731 
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Under the General Directive, private and governmental processors and 
controllers are bound equally.133 Because data protection is a fundamental 
human right, the European model proposes to regulate it under a 
horizontal-action doctrine. This doctrine, inspired by the German concept 
of drittwirkung (horizontal action), suggests that the Constitution governs 
not only relations between individuals and the state, but also relations 
between private individuals. The state is obligated not only to abstain from 
encroaching upon human rights to thus foster their effective realization 
through relevant conditions, but also to provide for their observance by 
private persons.134 
The burden of compliance imposed on private controllers by the statute 
triggers a question: do the protected data subjects appreciate what the law 
does for them? A 2002 European Commission’s Open Consultation survey 
of 9,156 European citizens yielded an interesting result: while in theory a 
number of respondents are concerned about data protection, in practice 
they rarely take steps to exercise the rights provided by the EU 
legislation.135 For instance, sixty-nine percent of the respondents named 
fear of data misuse as a main reason to limit their online transactions, yet 
only twenty-eight percent of the respondents had applied to data 
controllers to access their personal record.136 Of those who did apply and 
received either a negative response or no response from the data 
controllers, only fifteen percent bothered to lodge a complaint.137  
These findings are hard to evaluate. An opponent to the European 
approach might say it misuses lawmaking and supervisory resources of the 
government to burden businesses, and those businesses then pass the costs 
of compliance on to consumers who cannot afford to bear these costs. In 
contrast, a supporter of this approach may find that the survey illustrates 
how citizens are unable to protect themselves against invasions of privacy. 
As Daniel Solove contends, 
(2001). 
 133. See generally General Directive, supra note 111. 
 134. PRIVACY Ukraine, Prava L’udyny la Internet [Human Rights and the Internet], available at 
http://www.internetrights.org.ua/index.php?page=chapters&id=16 (author’s trans.) (last visited Jan. 6, 
2006). See, e.g., O.A. Krasavchikov, supra note 91, at 423. 
 135. Id. at 219–20. 
 136. Id. 
 137. European Commission, Your Views on Data Protection: Questionnaire for on the 
Implementation of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), available at http://www.privacy 
exchange.org/survey/surveys/consultation-citizens.pdf (last visited Dec. 22, 2005) (showing results of 
on-line consultation from June 20, 2002 to Sept. 15, 2002). 
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[i]t is difficult for the individual to adequately value specific pieces 
of personal information. . . . [because it] is linked to uncertain future 
uses . . . . An individual may give out bits of information in 
different contexts, each transfer appearing innocuous. However, the 
information can be aggregated and could prove to be invasive of the 
private life when combined with other information. It is the totality 
of information about a person and how it is used that poses the 
greatest threat to privacy.138 
Interestingly, in another survey, the European private data controllers 
supported governmental control. Thus, ninety-nine percent of respondents 
agreed that the data protection law was necessary, sixty-four percent found 
it necessary in all sectors of activity without exception, and fifty-eight 
percent described the existing regulations as “not unduly strict.”139 
2. The Valuable Asset Approach and Justification for Self-Regulation 
The U.S. system, in contrast to that of the EU, has seen the essential 
value in restricting governmental intrusion into the practices of private 
data controllers. As Eugene Volokh notes, “[o]nce people grow to accept 
and even like government restrictions on supposedly ‘unfair’ 
communication . . . it may become much easier to accept ‘codes of fair 
reporting,’ . . . ‘codes of fair debate,’ ‘codes of fair political criticism,’ and 
the like.”140 
If individuals do not value their personal data enough to actively 
protect themselves, why should the government bother to do it for them? If 
personal data is a private asset, then governmental intrusion into regulation 
of the data flow should be minimal. As Richard Posner notes, “few people 
want to be let alone. Rather, they want to manipulate the world around 
them by selective disclosure of facts about themselves . . . . People sell 
themselves, as well as their goods.”141 If we do not tolerate 
misrepresentations regarding the quality of goods, why should we tolerate 
them regarding one’s person? Why should the law not promote the free 
 138. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information 
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1452 (2001). 
 139. European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer: Data Protection in the European Union—
Executive Summary, http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/flash/fl147_exec_summ.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Eurobarometer]. 
 140. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of 
a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1116 (2000). 
 141. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 233–34 (1981). 
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flow of information to enable people to make well informed decisions 
about their relationships?142 
Flexibility of private law can offer two major regimes for framing data 
protection: the property (contractual) regime and the liability (tort) regime, 
each of which has its own advantages.143 
The liability regime focuses on the harm (damage) that can result from 
abuse of the data. This was the approach advocated by Warren and 
Brandeis, the forefathers of privacy rights in the United States.144 They 
contended that privacy was different from property, because the core of 
invasion was mental pain and suffering rather than appropriation of a 
personal asset.145 They further contended that publication of a personal 
occurrence neither deprived a data subject of an asset, nor caused tangible 
damage, but it did disturb peace of mind.146 According to Warren and 
Brandeis, the copyright (intellectual property) concept would not 
adequately protect personal information either, because it was designed to 
protect intellectual products, not domestic occurrences.147  
The liability approach requires governmental interference only in 
reaction to tangible harm (damage) to a data subject. Typical examples of 
this approach are Shibley v. Time148 and Dwyer v. American Express.149 In 
Shibley, the court gave no remedy to newspaper subscribers who were 
unhappy that Time’s subscription list was sold to a direct marketing 
company without their consent. The court saw no actual damage to the 
subscribers in such a sale.150 Similarly, in Dwyer, the court denied 
compensation to credit card holders when the company aggregated their 
spending habits without their knowledge and rented the resulting database 
to an advertising company.151 The Dwyer court reasoned that although the 
demographic information was a valuable asset, its collection brought no 
economic loss to the data subjects. Therefore, its use did not constitute 
damage to them.152 
 142. See generally Volokh, supra note 140. 
 143. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); Lawrence Lessig, 
The Law of The Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999). 
 144. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 117. 
 145. Id. at 207. 
 146. Id. at 219–20. 
 147. Id. 
 148. 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).  
 149. 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995). 
 150. Shibley, 341 N.E.2d at 339–40. 
 151. Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d at 1351. 
 152. Id. at 1356. 
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Because the United States developed few restrictions on the types of 
information that businesses can collect and what they can do with such 
information,153 a several billion dollar industry has arisen that is devoted to 
creating gigantic databases of personal information.154 Advertisers argue 
that collection of data permits “them to offer consumers preferred products 
and services, improve their marketing efficiencies and Website designs, 
and subsidize free Internet content. . . .”155 
On the other hand, the emergence of data-processing industries 
catalyzed a discussion that personal data requires protection based on 
choice, rather than harm; on property, rather than liability. For example, 
Lawrence Lessig contends that “a property regime requires negotiation 
before taking; a liability regime allows a taking, and payment later.”156 
Under the property rules, it is an individual who would decide how much 
his or her personal information costs.157 Under a liability regime, this 
control leaves the private hands and shifts to a court, a jury, or a statute.158 
It affords only as much compensation as a reasonable person deems 
necessary. In the meantime, the property regime would protect equally a 
person who values her data and one who does not. Each can choose how 
much to take in exchange for disclosure of valuable information.159 An 
example of the property-based data exchange is a modern preferred-
customer card. Offering the card, stores extend discounts to shoppers in 
exchange for their consent to having their identity and spending habits 
shared.  
Despite the advantages of the private self-regulation approach, it has 
posed a considerable challenge to U.S. policymakers in recent years. In 
fact, although the United States has not created any special data protection 
authority, social concern triggered the decision to delegate certain 
oversight mandates to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC).160 In 
accordance with the FTC’s 2000 survey, ninety-two percent of individuals 
from online households stated that they do not trust online companies to 
keep their personal information confidential, and feel that self-regulatory 
initiatives are insufficient.161 Thus, “only eight percent of heavily 
 153. MANN & WINN, supra note 123, at 152. 
 154. SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 11, at 492. 
 155. William Challis & Ann Cavoukian, The Case for a U.S. Privacy Commissioner: A Canadian 
Commissioner’s Perspective, 19 MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 20 (2000). 
 156. SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 11, at 510–12. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 510 (quoting LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999)). 
 160. Id. at 541. 
 161. U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC 
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trafficked websites display a seal from one of the self-regulatory seal 
programs.”162 As Marc Rottenberg contends, the “privacy policy in the 
United States today reflects what industry is prepared to do rather than 
what the public wants done.”163 Eighty-two percent of the respondents to 
the FTC’s survey suggested that government should regulate online 
companies’ use of personal information.164 Advocates of statutory 
supervision suggest that private regulation does not consider that the use 
of data provides “access to social power.”165 When the law starts treating 
personal data as an economic asset, it divides the people by “those who 
can afford privacy and those who cannot.”166  
C. Micro-Structure of the Western Data Protection: The Solidity of 
Definitions or the Flexibility of Principles? 
In terms of setting an effective micro-structure for data protection, a 
comprehensive statute can provide a wealth of clear-cut, harmonized rules 
and definitions that will promote uniformity and certainty in enforcement. 
On the other hand, statutory definitions may turn out to be artificial, stiff, 
and quickly outmoded, especially in the face of rapid technological 
advances. Self-regulation, in turn, presents a danger of ad hoc, messy, and 
incoherent setting of standards. However, it provides a much better 
opportunity for gradual evolution of viable concepts which would 
correspond to the social awareness and would easily adapt to any new 
conditions. 
The European Directives offer a well-organized treasury of terms and 
rules. For example, article 2 of the General Directive defines the key terms 
“personal data,” “processing,” “filing system,” “controller,” “processor,” 
“third party,” and “data subject consent.”167 Further, the Directive 
establishes six conventional principles forming the “skeleton” or the 
“core” of the microstructure for data protection: 
MARKETPLACE PRIVACY ONLINE, A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf [hereinafter FTC REPORT]. 
 162. Id. at 35. 
 163. Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry 
Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶ 119. 
 164. FTC REPORT, supra note 161, at 2. 
 165. Katrin S. Byford, Privacy in Cyberpace: Constructing A Model of Privacy for the Electronic 
Communication Environment, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 56 (1998). 
 166. Id. at 57. 
 167. General Directive, supra note 111, art. 2. 
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(1) legitimacy: personal data may only be processed for limited 
purposes; (2) finality: personal data may only be collected for 
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and may not be further 
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes; (3) 
transparency: the data subject must be informed regarding data 
processing related to him; (4) proportionality: personal data must be 
adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for 
which it is collected and processed; (5) confidentiality and security: 
technical and organizational measures to ensure confidentiality and 
security must accompany processing of the data; and (6) control: 
DPAs must ensure supervision of processing.168 
In addition to offering a working scheme for data protection, the 
European directives present the most advanced product of harmonization 
in the field. They present a compelling guidance for setting legislative 
frameworks in all members of the EU. Furthermore, the language of the 
General Directive largely reflects the language of the Council of Europe 
Data Protection Convention and the OECD Guidelines—the documents, 
adopted in consultation with the vast majority of developed non-EU 
economies, including Japan, Canada, the United States, and Australia.  
However, clear-cut definitions and stringent principles still possess the 
implicit danger of easily becoming outdated. The field of data protection is 
directly affected by technological developments.169 One of the common 
criticisms of the General Directive is that it was drafted in an era of 
mainframe computers and may cope poorly with the advance of Internet 
technology.170 For example, the general definition of personal data as “any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”171 
seems to stretch easily to a variety of settings. Nevertheless, it remains 
unclear if an email, a dynamic IP address, clickstream information, or log 
files are embraced by this definition.172 Paradoxically, the benefits of 
clear-cut formulas for data protection may hinder, rather than advance 
certainty in the context of technological development.  
American data protection law largely evolved in the absence of 
statutory language.173 This allowed private actors to set the policies to their 
liking, and, in order to ensure fairness, provided the common law courts 
 168. KUNER, supra note 104, at 17–18. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. General Directive, supra note 111, art. 2(a). 
 172. SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 11, at 721. 
 173. See id. at 2–25. 
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with vast discretion to determine which concepts are just.174 The first 
developments in American information privacy law, albeit only in the 
form of persuasive authority, emerged in a law review article tailored to 
the social concern.175 In the later nineteenth century, the rise of yellow 
journalism and technological inventions, such as instantaneous 
photography, which facilitated intrusions into private lives, inspired 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis to publish the article, The Right to 
Privacy.176 The authors suggested that as the need to secure the right “to 
be let alone” increases with the advance of civilization, the common law 
should “meet the new demands of society . . . without the interposition on 
the legislature.”177 
Following this appeal, in 1905 Georgia became the first state to 
recognize a common law tort action for privacy invasions.178 In Pavesich 
v. New England Life Ins. Co., a Georgia court penalized a newspaper for 
publication of the plaintiff’s picture on a life insurance advertisement 
without his consent.179 The court concluded that “[t]he right of privacy has 
its foundation in the instincts of nature. It is recognized intuitively, 
consciousness being the witness that can be called to establish its 
existence.”180 
It would be unfair to say that all courts in the United States endorse 
non-statutory legalization of the data protection framework. Public debate 
continues as to how much discretion judges, as opposed to legislatures, 
should hold.181 In fact, the first case citing Right to Privacy, Roberson v. 
Rochester Folding Box Co., declined to implement protection of privacy 
absent a statutory framework.182 The Roberson court found it permissible 
to publish a lithograph on the advertisements without authorization of the 
model, because there was neither statute, nor precedent banning such 
publication. The court held that “[t]he courts . . . being without authority to 
 174. See id. 
 175. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 117. See also SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 11, at 
3–5. 
 176. Id. at 3. 
 177. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 117, at 195. See also SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 11, 
at 193–95. 
 178. SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 11, at 65 (citing Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 
50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905)). 
 179. 50 S.E. 68, 68–69 (Ga. 1905). 
 180. Id. at 69. 
 181. Examples of “pro-statutory” cases include J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 
1981) and Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO v. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 
791 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (expressing the court’s “grave doubts as to the existence of a constitutional right 
of privacy in the nondisclosure of personal information.”). 
 182. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). 
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legislate, are required to decide cases upon principle. . . .”183 Afraid to 
bring incoherence to the legal system by an arbitrary judgment of the first 
impression, the court further concluded, “the mischief which will finally 
result [from an arbitrary application of a principle] may be almost 
incalculable under our system, which makes a decision in one case a 
precedent for decisions in all future cases.”184  
Even Warren and Brandeis recognized that court-devised limitations as 
to concrete factual situations made the doctrine difficult to apply, and “to a 
certain extent uncertain in its operation and easily rendered abortive.”185 
Studying a line of privacy cases, an outsider can get easily confused, as the 
approach differs from circuit to circuit. For example, Cline v. Rogers186 
establishes that an individual has no constitutional right to privacy in her 
criminal record. Paul v. Verniero187 upheld a law authorizing police to 
notify the community if a new neighbor was a sexual offense convict. 
However, Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n188 and Melvin v. Reid189 
punished the media for revealing the names of a former prostitute and a 
former hijacker, despite that the names came from the public court record. 
To reconcile seemingly conflicting precedents under the self-regulatory 
U.S. court system, one needs to match facts to a policy, not a rule.190 In the 
absence of definitions, courts develop principles of social policy to 
scrutinize disputed conduct. For instance, in his famous concurrence in 
Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan suggested a two-fold test to assess 
whether privacy was violated: “first . . . a person [must] have exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second . . . the expectation 
[must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”191  
Flexible non-statutory definitions, although messy, offer an important 
advantage that the statute cannot provide. They allow the court to adapt 
any rule or concept to society’s concept of fairness at a certain time in its 
evolution. As Kathryn Hendley observed, “[p]erhaps the concept of 
 183. Id. at 443. 
 184. Id. at 444. 
 185. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 117, at 215–16. 
 186. 87 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 187. 170 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 188. 483 P.2d 34, 43–44 (Cal. 1971). 
 189. 297 P. 91, 93–94 (Cal. 1931). 
 190. Not only can an outsider become confused by the contradictions within U.S. privacy case 
law, but the conflicting standards are also troublesome to a civil law attorney with great familiarity 
with the U.S. legal system. While the privacy cases may originate from a variety of jurisdictions, all of 
the cases purport to interpret the Constitution. Even between this Article’s two authors, these 
contradictions were less troublesome to the common law attorney than to the civil law attorney.  
 191. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
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‘private property,’ ostensibly the ultimate material incentive, should be 
applied to both the state and the law per se—it is ‘our’ state, and the law 
belongs to us, too.”192 When definitions are easily adaptable to 
technological evolution and contextual circumstances, it is the social 
demand that shapes the supply of legal rules, not vice versa; the citizens 
are urged to put trust into their state and law.  
D. Data Protection Versus Free Flow of Information: The Art of 
Balancing 
The micro-structure of definitions versus principles tangibly affects the 
balancing of data protection with free information flow. The European 
General Directive defines balancing proactively, by establishing sets of a 
priori defaults and exceptions. The U.S. courts are doomed to engage in 
balancing reactively as they weigh the arguments of two conflicting 
parties. As a consequence, statutory balancing is more likely to shift the 
defaults from freedom of information to protection of data. Because under 
self-regulation the law is silent unless a data subject actively stands up, the 
default allows a data controller to use the information as he pleases. When 
a legislature decides to adopt a data protection statute, the name and 
purpose of the statute itself suggest a default in favor of data protection. 
Free flow of information might obtain regard through exceptions if the 
legislature opts to put them in place. As a consequence, adoption of a data 
protection statute likely will shift the balance away from the free flow of 
information, even if the statute were liberally phrased.  
1. A Restrictive Default in the World of Statutes 
Article 1 of the General Directive expressly defines the object of its 
regulation as: (1) to protect [the right of natural persons] to privacy with 
respect to the processing of personal data and (2) to ensure free flow of 
personal data between the member states.193 
The European default restricts any operations with personal data unless 
a specific exception applies.194 For example, article 8 bans processing of 
sensitive data in paragraph (1) but paragraphs (2)–(5) enumerate as many 
as nine exceptions making such processing legitimate.195 Similarly, 
 192. Kathryn Hendley, Demand for Law: Rewriting the Rules of the Game in Russia: The 
Neglected Issue of the Demand for Law, 8 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 89, 95 (1999). 
 193. General Directive, supra note 111, art. 1. 
 194. Id. art. 7. 
 195. Id. art. 8, ¶¶ 1–5. 
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paragraph (1) of article 11 imposes a demanding notification requirement 
on data controllers, while paragraph (2) specifies conditions for release 
from the obligation.196 Additionally, paragraph (1) of article 18 requires 
that data controllers notify supervisory authority before carrying out 
automatic processing of personal data, but paragraph (2) of that same 
section provides the circumstances when this notification requirement may 
be simplified or exempt.197 Exceptions favoring the free flow of 
information are purpose-based. The General Directive enumerates 
exceptions for statistical, scientific, historical research processing,198 
journalism,199 the benefit of the data subject,200 and others. The exceptions 
are deliberate, concrete, and generally immediately follow the restrictions 
they cancel. Such a structure both facilitates the information balancing 
process, and reiterates the concurrence of interests in free flow of 
information and in protection of data.  
In spite of the statute’s attempt to provide careful balancing, the 
European Commission has received criticism that the current regime is 
overly restrictive on private controllers.201 The complaints suggest that 
“certain provisions of the General Directive, impose onerous requirements 
that are out of proportion to their value in protecting the privacy rights of 
data subjects (the legal regime for notification of data processing is an 
example).”202 For example, in the recent Lindquist case (Sweden), the 
local data protection authority (DPA) imposed a fine on a church 
volunteer. The volunteer, who tried to enhance interaction between the 
church members, created a website with their names, contact information, 
and hobbies, without first obtaining their consent or consulting the DPA in 
advance. The DPA was especially concerned about posting information 
that one church member had recently injured her foot, as health data falls 
under a special category of protection as “sensitive.”203 On another 
occasion, the Spanish DPA imposed a fine of 10 million pesetas (approx. 
60,000 Euro) on Microsoft Iberica SRL for processing personal data 
without the consent of data subjects.204 Calling for amendments, the 
Swedish Ministry of Justice, for example, concluded that “[i]n order for 
 196. Id. art. 11, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 197. Id. art. 18, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 198. Id. art. 6. 
 199. Id. art. 9. 
 200. Id. art. 7(d). 
 201. Commission Report, supra note 103. 
 202. KUNER, supra note 104, at 47. 
 203. Case C-101/01, Lindquist v. Aklagarkammaren I Jonkoping. 
 204. KUNER, supra note 104, at 38. 
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the provisions to gain acceptance and to have a real breakthrough in their 
practical application, they must be simplified and concentrate on the 
essentials, namely, for protecting against harmful acts in the nature of 
misuse.”205  
In response to the complaints, however, the Commission rebuts that the 
problem is not the statute, but the enforcement. Per the Commission, the 
enforcers do not take advantage of the exceptions from the default 
restrictions as much as they should.206 
2. A Laissez-Faire Default in the No-Statute World 
In the United States, by contrast, the absence of a restrictive statute has 
given data controllers a default of free conduct with data unless a data 
subject acts affirmatively to impose a restriction. Moreover, this default is 
reinforced by the constitutional right to freedom of speech. In First 
Amendment free speech cases, commercial controllers are subject to 
“intermediate scrutiny,” while the media, because of its “democracy 
watchdog” status, enjoys an almost absolute protection.207 
The concept of intermediate scrutiny established by Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of N.Y.208 enables the 
government to impose restrictions on lawful, non-misleading commercial 
speech only if: (1) the government has a substantial interest in regulating 
the speech; (2) regulation directly and materially advances that interest; 
and (3) regulation is no more extensive than necessary to serve the 
interest.209 The effect of intermediate scrutiny analysis is that the 
government avoids direct restriction wherever possible; however, it does 
uphold an individual’s restrictive action. For example, in U.S. West Inc. v. 
FCC, the court invalidated a Federal Communication Commission (FCC) 
order requiring telecommunications companies to seek consumer approval 
before using a customer’s personal information for marketing purposes.210 
The court reasoned that the FCC: 
merely speculate[s] that there are a substantial number of 
individuals who feel strongly about their privacy, yet would not 
 205. Id. at 48 n.198 (quoting Swedish Ministry of Justice, Simplified protection for personal data 
applying misuse model (Nov. 30, 2000) (unpublished memorandum)). 
 206. Commission Report, supra note 103, at 24. 
 207. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 564. 
 210. 182 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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bother to opt-out if given notice and the opportunity to do so. Such 
speculation hardly reflects the careful calculation of costs and 
benefits that our commercial speech jurisprudence requires.211 
Media enjoys almost absolute protection. Social policy tries to shield 
the media from the threat of lawsuits, to make sure that “media is not 
‘chilled’ from running certain stories if the state starts imposing on it costs 
for gathering, producing, and disseminating news.”212 In Bartnicki v. 
Vopper, the court struck down the Wiretap Act’s provision expressly 
prohibiting publication of unlawfully intercepted conversations, when the 
information published was of public interest.213 The plaintiff, a labor union 
leader, suggested on the phone to his colleague that they should resort to 
violence if the union’s demands were not met.214 When the defendants 
found a tape of the conversation intercepted by a third party and broadcast 
it on the radio, they were released from liability for such use of personal 
information.215 
However, as Daniel Solove argues, the law recognizes the “great 
potential for media information gathering to become intrusive and 
harassing, especially when a person becomes the subject of a prominent 
story.”216 Under such circumstances, the law does restrict the media’s 
conduct in its collection of information and its choice as to what to 
publish. For example, in Gallela v. Onassis, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled against a paparazzo who had committed a series of 
obnoxious actions interfering with life of the famous Onassis family.217 In 
Gallela, the court held that “[c]rimes and torts committed in news 
gathering are not protected by the First Amendment. . . . There’s no threat 
to free press in requiring its agents to act within the law.”218 The Ninth 
Circuit, in Dietemann v. Time penalized a newspaper for the secret use of a 
hidden camera and tape recorder in the home of a poor, uneducated 
medicine man, to collect evidence to ridicule his medical beliefs.219 
However, in Desnick v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., the Seventh 
Circuit refused to penalize the media for an “undercover investigation” 
aimed to reveal fraud and abuse in a well-established and recognized 
 211. Id. at 1239. 
 212. SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 11, at 117. 
 213. 200 F.3d 109, 130 (3d. Cir. 1999), aff’d, 552 U.S. 514 (2001). 
 214. Id. at 113. 
 215. Id. 
 216. SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 11, at 69. 
 217. 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 218. Id. at 995–96. 
 219. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).  
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clinic.220 The court reasoned that unlike in Dietemann, this investigation 
was not conducted within the subject’s home; the social interest to prevent 
fraud in a licensed clinic was substantial; and the undercover investigation, 
although deceptive, did not disrupt operation of the institution.221 
Non-statutory flexibility allows a delicate balance in each controversy 
presented before the court. However, such a scheme relies heavily on the 
adequacy of various legal institutions. In the absence of statutory guidance 
and enforcement, private controllers have an incentive to restrict use of 
personal data only when they fear lawsuits. This fear materializes only if 
individuals are willing to go to court. This willingness, in turn, is 
predicated on the professionalism and morality of judges. Finally, the high 
morality of judges is not nourished without the free flow of information to 
allow for easy criticism of incompetent judges and biased decisions. The 
social value of free information flow in such a system closes the circle by 
establishing a default against personal data privacy.  
In recent years, the United States has found its privacy system 
inefficient. As fear of lawsuits can motivate self-censorship of private data 
controllers, data subjects fear that their personal information will be 
abused in the absence of a stricter regulation has motivated self-censorship 
of their engagement with private businesses. In its 2002 study, the research 
facility, Media Jupiter Metrix, estimated that privacy and security 
concerns could cost online vendors almost 25 billion by 2006.222 As 
Avivah Litan, a leading analyst from the Gartner Center, once exclaimed: 
“People are paranoid; they don’t want to give their information away and 
they have a right to be paranoid.”223 
Social concern prompted Congress to restrict the default rule of free 
commercial speech through legislation regarding sensitive data. For 
example, the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA),224 prohibits videotape 
service providers from knowingly disclosing personal information, such as 
titles of video cassettes rented or purchased, without the subject’s written 
consent. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) prohibits use of 
a fax machine to send unsolicited messages.225 The Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (FCRA) requires credit reporting companies to provide individual 
 220. 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 221. Id. at 1351–54. 
 222. Robert Leathern, Jupiter Media Metrix, Online Privacy, Vision Report (2002), at 
http://www.jup.com/bin/item.pl/search/ (guest registration required). 
 223. Joe Wilcox, Study: Customers Wary of Online Ads, at http://news.com.com/2100-1001-
892808.html. 
 224. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 et. seq. (2002). 
 225. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1991). 
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access to records, establishes procedures for correcting erroneous personal 
information, and sets limitations on disclosure.226 
The EU statutory mechanism and the U.S. non-statutory mechanism 
each present important benefits to their constituencies while challenging 
them with their shortcomings. The statute allows Europeans to regulate 
data privacy as an important social value, to create a clear-cut system of 
rules and definitions, and to balance freedom of speech and privacy 
through an established set of imperative defaults in favor of data 
protection with important exceptions for information flow in return. 
However, one must ask whether society needs the government to spend 
resources on proactive public enforcement if definitions become easily 
outdated, and if balancing imposes an undue burden on development of 
the private sector. Self-regulation has allowed the United States to give 
individuals and companies extensive choice as to data processing 
practices; to facilitate development of adaptable, up-to-date rules and 
definitions; and to advance the free flow of information as a safeguard to a 
democratic society. At the same time, it created threats of inadequate 
protection for an important value, haphazard precedent setting, and 
reluctance of the individuals to engage with data-collecting industries for 
the fear of data misuse.  
Which approach’s advantages would be more tangible, if applied to the 
Ukrainian context? What drawbacks of each, when planted into the 
Ukrainian soil, will show up faster? Let us now turn to transplantation in 
context, as we return to a fork in the decision-making road for Ukraine.  
IV. TO HAVE OR NOT TO HAVE: WHAT IS THE SOLUTION?  
As both approaches have their drawbacks, Ukraine cannot choose 
between black and white. Borrowing the foreign experience, it must rather 
resort to comparing shades of gray. One ultimate issue in the balancing 
test is to determine the default and weigh the costs of transition against the 
benefits of optimization. As Frederick Schauer suggested, “[c]haracteristic 
modalities of law are ones that are premised, at least in part, on stability 
for stability’s sake, and thus on the view that in some or many contexts the 
costs of transition to a new rule exceed the benefits of optimization.”227 
Because the current default in Ukraine is set at no omnibus data protection 
 226. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et. seq. (2002). 
 227. Frederick Schauer, Legal Transitions: Is There an Ideal Way to Deal with the Non-Ideal 
World of Legal Change?: Legal Development and the Problem of Systemic Transition, 13 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 261, 265 (2003). 
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statute, the issue boils down to balancing costs and benefits of changing 
this default rule and transitioning to a scheme regulated by an omnibus 
statute. 
What benefits will Ukraine gain if the default rule is changed, and what 
are the costs and risks of obtaining these benefits? Is the country ready to 
pay these costs and internalize the losses? How great is the cost of non-
transition if the country cannot embrace transition successfully? 
A. Costs of Transition for Macrostructure: Lack of Enforcement 
Resources 
1. Benefits of Transition to the Statute for the Macrostructure of Data 
Protection 
To build a social-law-based state where the goal is not a laissez-faire 
economy, but rather “human rights and freedoms,”228 an omnibus statute 
does advance a macrostructure of the law on data protection. Lack of a 
comprehensive statute to provide for public enforcement may cause 
Ukraine to overlook its constitutional obligations, as well as its obligations 
under the European Convention of Human Rights. This concern can be 
demonstrated by the fact that in the United States, where the Constitution 
implicitly safeguards privacy, it recently has been recognized that self-
regulation alone provides insufficient protection to the social value of 
information privacy.  
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission was an active proponent of 
business self-regulation at the start of its involvement with the privacy 
issues.229 However, in 2000, after the Commission conducted 
comprehensive monitoring of such self-regulation results, it was forced to 
concede its strategy’s failure and to call for the adoption of major new 
legislation.230 By contrast, the European authorities acknowledge that there 
is much room for criticism of the General Directive, but find current data 
protection shortcomings incidental to, rather than inherent in, legislative 
regulation.231 In its 2003 Report, the European Commission concluded that 
the “[General] Directive fulfilled its principal objective of removing 
barriers to the free movement of personal data between the member 
states”232 and decided that no amendments were needed.233 As Internal 
 228. UKR. CONST. art. 3. 
 229. MANN & WINN, supra note 123, at 169. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Commission Report, supra note 103, at 7. 
 232. Id. at 10. 
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Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein summarized, “European citizens 
have a right to privacy . . . . [The] Directive has helped make sure that they 
can enjoy that right in practice.”234 
In addition to the European developments, the recent call for a privacy 
statute in the United States reinforces the position that implementation of a 
privacy statute is right for Ukraine if it is to fulfill its obligations under the 
Constitution and the European Convention.  
2. Costs of Transition to the Statute for the Macrostructure of Data 
Protection 
While a number of facts support the general idea of introducing a data 
protection statute in Ukraine, its implementation in the short term may 
bring an adverse result. The cost of transition will require allocation of 
sufficient resources for fair public enforcement. Modern scholarship warns 
that legal standards that work well in developed countries sometimes 
prove to be too ambitious when transplanted into a less efficient system.235 
Even the strong European economy finds it challenging to provide 
resources for enforcement of the data protection law. In its 2003 Report on 
Transposition of the General Directive, the European Commission 
recognized that enforcement had been “under-resourced,” compliance by 
data controllers was “very patchy,” and data subjects had an “apparently 
low level of knowledge of their rights.”236 A “Eurobarometer” survey 
showed that only forty-six percent of EU companies inform data subjects 
of the purposes of the processing.237 In accordance with another study, as 
many as ninety percent of German internet merchants do not comply fully 
with data protection laws.238 
If Germany, with a gross national product (GNP) of 22,740 USD per 
capita for 2004,239 cannot provide resources for better compliance, what 
 233. Id. at 7–8. 
 234. Press Release, European Commission, Data protection: Commission Report Shows that EU 
Law is Achieving Its Main Aims (May 16, 2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/ 
PressRelease.do?reference=IP/03/697&format=PDF (last visited Jan. 6, 2006). 
 235. FLORENCIO LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, THE POLITICS OF LEGAL REFORM YALE UNIVERSITY AND 
NBER G-24 DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 17 (2002). 
 236. Commission Report, supra note 103, at 12. 
 237. Eurobarometer, supra note 139. 
 238. KUNER, supra note 104, at 118 (quoting Marie-Anne Winter, Online Shops: 90 Prozent am 
Rande der Legalitat, Jan. 16, 2001, available at http://www.teltarif.de/intern/action/print/arch/ 
2001/kw03/s4076.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2006)). 
 239. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS DATABASE 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.worldbank.Org/data/countrydata/htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2006). 
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can be expected of Ukraine, with its 780 USD per capita GNP?240 Concern 
about lack of enforcement resources has become an essential argument 
against adoption of the current Bill on Data Protection in debates and 
discussions. As participants of the parliamentary roundtable in February 
2003 perceived, there is a “concern regarding the existence in Ukraine of a 
gap between fair requirements of the adopted laws and the practice of 
implementation.”241 The economic situation makes it unlikely that Ukraine 
will create a Data Protection Authority of a least comparable efficiency to 
its European counterparts. 
While resources are always scarce, in a healthy and stable state, the 
importance of omnibus enforcement is not necessarily a central issue. 
Selective and sudden state action can work just as well, offering a vaccine 
against violations by setting examples through successful prosecutions. 
However, in the context of Ukraine’s transition to democracy, patchy and 
selective public enforcement may cause more harm than no public 
enforcement at all. Ukraine is not yet healthy and stable, still weakened by 
the difficulties of economic and political transition. These difficulties have 
catalyzed the epidemic of corruption and inspired a certain nostalgia for 
authoritarian order. In accordance with Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index, Ukraine is ranked nineteenth most corrupt 
among almost 150 countries ranked.242 By way of comparison, the United 
States ranks 128th while the EU countries rank between seventy-first for 
Poland and 146th for Finland.243 In 2003, the International Foundation for 
Election Systems (IFES) Survey for Ukraine indicated that only twenty-nine 
percent of Ukrainians trusted the Cabinet of Ministers, twenty-six percent 
trusted the Parliament, and twenty-two percent trusted the President to act in 
good faith.244 
Recently the Orange Revolution, a large civic uprising at the end of 2004, 
brought the attention of the entire international community to the massive 
falsification of the voting results in the Ukraine’s presidential elections. Under 
 240. Id. at 2. 
 241. Global Internet Policy Initiative (GIPI), Zasidann’a Sektsiji Pryvatnist’/Publichnist’ 
informatsiji [Meeting of the Section Privacy/Publicity of Information], available at 
http://gipi.internews.ua/ukr/activity/initiatives/seminars/0228_deference.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2006) 
[hereinafter GIPI].  
 242. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2004, 5 (2004), 
available at http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2003/2003.10.07.cpi.en.html (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2006). 
 243. Id. 
 244. RAKESH SHARMA & NATHAN VANDUSEN, IFES, ATTITUDES AND EXPECTATIONS: PUBLIC 
OPINION IN UKRAINE 2003, 23 (2003), at http://www.ifes.org/searchable/ifes_site/PDF/new_initiative/ 
Ukraine_Survey_2003_English.pdf. 
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international and domestic pressure, a re-vote was held, which resulted in the 
installation of an allegedly pro-western candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, as 
Ukraine’s new President. President Yushchenko announced a fight against 
corruption as an ultimate goal of his presidency. However, in spite of healthy 
optimism about renaissance of democracy in Ukraine, much skepticism 
remains. As an April 2005 IFES survey indicated that a plurality still 
contented that Ukraine is not a democracy. Sixteen percent volunteer that 
Ukraine is somewhere in between—they are not willing to declare Ukraine a 
democracy but will not concede that Ukraine is not a democracy.245 The 
dismissal of the cabinet and certain other leading officials, appointed by 
President Yushchenko from among his closet associates within only nine 
months of their appointment, signified a collapse of his team under mutual 
accusations of corruption. 
While the epidemic of corruption sweeps society, selective enforcement 
contributes to the weakening of the legal system’s immunity against unfair 
practices. Creation of an additional underfunded state agency can easily create 
a new outlet for corruption, providing private controllers with an incentive to 
smooth the enforcement rather than internalize the burden of compliance.  
After messy and abundant reforms in the nineties, Ukrainian society in 
the new century is showing considerable nostalgia for certainty and order. 
The IFES Survey of 2003 indicated that most people would have preferred 
“a strong leader who could bring order over the kind of democracy [then] 
practiced in Ukraine.”246 In reference to democratic reform in the former 
Soviet bloc countries, Acting Coordinator of U.S. Assistance Thomas 
Adams said, “noticeable backsliding has occurred in recent years.”247 The 
Freedom House 2002 Report commended former President Kuchma for 
his ability to hold the opposition.248 
Although the Orange Revolution signifies a substantial breakthrough in 
the Ukrainian political climate, sudden change is unlikely. Recent re-
privatization scandals and discord between members of the new 
 245. KAREN BUERKLE, LISA KAMMERUD & RAKESH SHARMA, IFES, PUBLIC OPINION IN 
UKRAINE AFTER THE ORANGE REVOLUTION 25 (2005), at http://www.ifes.org. 
 246. MARK DIETRICH & RICHARD BLUE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL, DEVELOPING 
THE RULE OF LAW IN UKRAINE: ACHIEVEMENTS, IMPACTS, AND CHALLENGES 3, at http://pdf.dec.org/ 
pdf_docs/PNACR752.pdf (citations omitted). 
 247. U.S. Assistance Programs in Europe: An Assessment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Europe of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Thomas Adams, Acting 
Coordinator, U.S. Assistance in Europe and Eurasia, Bureau of European and Eurasion Affairs, Dep’t 
of State), available at http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/86082.PDF (last visited Jan. 
24, 2006). 
 248. FREEDOM HOUSE, NATIONS IN TRANSIT, UKRAINE: COUNTRY REPORT 607, available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org (last visited Jan. 6, 2006) [hereinafter FREEDOM HOUSE]. 
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government have resulted in paralysis of its working agenda. These 
problems show the system’s susceptibility to massive usurpation of 
enforcement powers by a certain political force to advance private, rather 
than public goals.249 Agencies may raise a “selective sword” when the 
governmental interest in data protection or the interest to suppress 
someone’s business is greater than the agency’s under-resourced 
enforcement capacities. 
There is a recent trend of using “selective sword” enforcement as an 
effective tool for taming the opposition, in conjunction with other 
seemingly democratic statutes. For example, during the recent presidency 
of Leonid Kuchma, Judge Zamkovenko, Chief Judge of a trial court in the 
capital city of Kyiv, had received a number of awards and commendations for 
his dedicated service until 2001. After several decisions unpopular with the 
government, the Supreme Council of Justice opened an investigation on 
corruption charges against the judge himself.250 The investigation uncovered 
that the judge had a legacy of intentionally withholding case files to delay 
citizens’ court appeals.251 Although litigants had lodged complaints about the 
judge for years, an investigation was not started until decisions passed that 
were unpopular with the government.252 
In view of insufficient enforcement resources in the foreground of 
corruption and the significant authoritarian legacy, transition to a data 
protection statute to enhance public value of information privacy may be 
prohibitively expensive for the short term. Unable to cope with the costs, the 
legal system may be tempted to privatize enforcement further in the hands of 
the minority of the most dishonest players, instead of advancing the country’s 
aim to comply with the international human right standards and its own 
constitutional obligations.  
 249. See, e.g., Yushchenko’s Popularity Sliding, CNN, Sept. 8, 2005, at http://www.cnn.com (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2005); Ukraine Tycoon Hopes Firing Government Will End Re-privatization, FORUM, 
Sept. 14, 2005, http://en.for-ua.com/news/2005/09/14/155016.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2006). 
 250. Id. 
 251. U.S. DEP’T OF ST., BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY 
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2002: UKRAINE (Mar. 31, 2003), available at 
http://www.State.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18398.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2006). 
 252. The Ukrainian newspaper, Zerkalo Nedeli, presents a number of arguments regarding Judge 
Zamkovenko’s illegal actions, which went unpunished until he adopted a wrong decision in the 
politically sensitive Timoshenko case. Alexandra Primachenko, The Inside of the Judge’s Robe, 46 
(471) ZERKALO NEDELI (Nov. 29, 2003–Dec. 5, 2003). 
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B. Impact of Cost of Transition on Microsctructure: Lack of Demand 
1. Benefits of Transition to the Statute for the Microstructure of Data 
Protection 
Analysis of transitional implications on microstructure of the data 
protection framework yields similar results. Adoption of a statute promises 
important advantages over self-regulation, but the cost of obtaining them 
makes it reasonable to postpone the transition.  
Although the European Directives are sometimes criticized as 
outmoded and stiff, changing an outmoded statute takes less time than 
stirring an evolution of policy-based judicial precedents from Ukraine’s 
civil law tradition. In the absence of a backbone statute, the Ukrainian 
justice system may be unable to turn the chaos of scattered norms and 
provisions into an orderly, structured legal policy. Even U.S. privacy case 
law shows a lack of unanimity among judges. In Ukraine, where legal 
textbooks even recently matched the term “judicial law-making” with the 
term “arbitrary,” and where the Supreme Court Chief Justice complains 
that “[f]or centuries the judicial power has been portrayed as insignificant, 
constantly hindering somebody and doing everything wrong,”253 judges 
may be not eager to take on leadership in defining the scope of actual data 
protection.  
The Ukrainian judiciary does not have a history of independent 
judgment. The cost of not transitioning to a statute is a growing loss of 
hope that the justice system will sculpt the microstructure of information 
privacy through policy-based interpretation, as the U.S. justice system did. 
However, the transition will require that the legislature, instead of the 
judiciary, shape needed rules and definitions. The question arises whether 
the legislature or judiciary is better equipped to articulate the appropriate 
microstructure. 
2. Costs of Transition to the Statute for the Microstructure of Data 
Protection  
Unlike the judiciary, which can have years to tailor policies in response 
to emergent social concerns, the legislature must do so expediently. It is 
important to remember that in the European Union and western Europe, 
state legal action against misuse of personal data by private controllers 
 253. BBC Monitoring Online, Ukrainian Chief Judge Interviewed on Judicial System (Mar. 28, 
2003), http://www.monitor.bbc.co.uk/database.shtml (subscription required). 
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took place only after social concern emerged, long after the free flow of 
information was a rooted democratic value. In Ukraine this is not the case. 
The goals of freedom of information and protection of privacy only 
recently have been imported into the mainstream official culture. 
Analyzing failures of the Russian business law reforms, Kathryn Hendley 
suggested lack of demand for law as an important reason: the catchphrase 
“if you build it, they will come,” does not seem to work in transplanting a 
reform.254 “Before any type of legal reform can take hold in the Ukrainian 
society, Ukrainians themselves have to genuinely believe in and take 
ownership of reform ideas, principles, and theories.”255  
The demand for a statute regulating private data controllers has not 
ripened yet in Ukraine’s society. The public has not begun to perceive a 
threat to personal inviolability by private data control. Most individuals in 
Ukraine receive salaries and transact in cash, and few have bank accounts. 
Medical records are held largely in governmental clinics and rarely are 
computerized. The direct advertisement business is taking its first steps. 
Valentyn Kalashnyk, director of the five-year-old direct marketing 
company OS Direct, shared in an interview with a business journal that, 
although the Constitution and the Law on Information provide a cause of 
action for privacy intrusions, his company had not had any lawsuits.256 In 
the six months preceding the interview, at most five customers had 
objected to OS Direct’s use of their personal data.257 Although computer 
technology has been penetrating at an increasing rate, it has not reached 
nearly a critical mass of the population to give rise to the prosperous data-
collection businesses. For example, although the number of Internet users 
in Ukraine is reported to have grown from only 400 people in 1993 to 
900,000 people in 2002,258 in relation to the total population of nearly 50 
million, this number constitutes less then one percent. Further, among these 
users, only twenty-two percent in 2001 and six percent in 2002 made 
online purchases.259 According to the UNDP Report, consumer doubt as to 
 254. Hendley, supra note 192, at 89. 
 255. Kim Ratushny, Toward the “Independence . . . of Judges” in Ukraine?, 62 SASK. L. REV. 
567, 584 (1999). 
 256. Id. 
 257. A. Kashpur, Dyrekt-Marketing Staje Nebezpechnym [Direct Marketing Becomes Dangerous], 
34 HALYTSKI KONTRAKTY (2000). 
 258. United Nations, Dep’t of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division, Millennium 
Indicators: Ukrainian Country Profile, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi.asp (Choose “Ukraine” under 
Step 1; Choose “1990–2005” under Step 2) (last visited Jan. 6, 2006). 
 259. UNDP REPORT, supra note 19, at 31. 
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the quality of goods, and the limited use of credit cards as a payment 
system will keep the trend stable for some time.260  
One may argue that the apparent lack of data collection by businesses 
does not justify postponing a data protection statute. Currently, as 
technology is developing rapidly and the country wants to ensure human 
rights and growth of international cooperation, adopting a statute in 
anticipation of business would allow businesses and judges to react 
gradually. 
Instead of channeling future relations in the right direction from their 
inception, a data protection statute in advance of its demand articulates a 
clear need for particular provisions, and unfortunately, aggravates the risk 
of imposing artificial and incoherent restrictions. This risk exists even if 
borrowing European concepts rather than inventing Ukraine’s own costly 
remedy. Already, the European terms often are labeled as outmoded. 
Moreover, the Ukrainian context might be different and the law could 
create even more ambiguities and uncertainties than its absence. Analysis 
of the language of the Bill on Data Protection demonstrates that current 
lawmakers are not much more in the loop than is the current system of 
justice. For example, the Bill establishes that personal data is property of 
the data subject. It further states, “the right to property in personal data is 
absolute, inalienable, inviolable, and inseparable.”261 The Constitution 
defines property rights as the owner’s authority to possess, use, and 
dispose of an object at the owner’s full discretion.262 It is unclear how the 
concept of inalienable property will fit into this definition. While the 
authors maintain that this approach is more advanced than that practiced 
abroad,263 it suggests a hybrid of the European inalienable human right and 
the U.S. valuable tradable commodity. Before data collection business 
takes its roots, the choice of the right formulations may become an overly 
burdensome task for lawmakers.  
Unless a statute first evolves in social awareness and then becomes 
transposed onto paper, it will not resolve the civil law judiciary’s desire 
for certainty. As European experience indicates, technology renders terms 
obsolete with amazing speed. Once this happens, the judiciary’s challenge 
to comply with an antiquated statute will be even greater than the 
challenge to create fair rules of interpretation of the general constitutional 
principles in the absence of a detailed statutory instruction.  
 260. Id. 
 261. Bill on Data Protection, supra note 92, art. 7. 
 262. UKR. CONST. art. 41. 
 263. BARANOV, supra note 65, at 126. 
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3. Costs of Non-Transition to the Statute for the Microstructure of 
Data Protection 
In the absence of a statute, primary rulemaking authority will not fall 
upon judges, but rather on private businesses, organizations, and 
individuals themselves. Although the U.S. Federal Trade Commission 
found self-regulation insufficient, it acknowledged that the industries had 
achieved significant success in setting initial standards.264 
Through trial and error and competition, private controllers in Ukraine 
will be better positioned and more motivated to harmonize the active 
framework using the best foreign practices, than the legislature, which is 
pressured by foreign donors and lacking in empirical experience. As time 
passes, private self-regulation may prove insufficient for protecting the 
rights of individuals. Even in the longstanding laissez-faire U.S. economy, 
the need to mend self-regulation with sectoral statutes has been 
acknowledged. However, once a society develops new sets of relations and 
sees a concrete threat of harm to the personal data associated with these 
relations, the cost of transitioning to a new statute will shrink compared to 
the cost of non-transition. Social institutions and legislature will be better 
suited to demand and supply, respectively, an adequate statute.  
Until then, it is unfair to claim nascent businesses have no guidance in 
setting data-processing practices, and data subjects have no redress to 
violations of their privacy rights. The current framework is messy, but if 
handled professionally, it can provide a European-style protection to 
individuals. For example, the Law on Information establishes principles of 
collection and storage minimization, notification, consent, and access with 
regard to processing personal information.265 
Furthermore, the current Ukrainian Constitution has a direct impact,266 
by allowing individuals to assert their constitutional rights regardless of 
whether interpretive legislation exists.267 The direct effect of the 
Constitution has been enhanced by the 2004 Civil Code’s open-ended list 
of personality rights, whose violation may mandate damages.268 An 
individual concerned with data protection can already use these 
instruments to demand that private controllers follow European-style use 
 264. FTC REPORT, supra note 161, at 35. 
 265. Law on Information, supra note 30, art. 31. 
 266. UKR. CONST. art. 8. 
 267. UKR. CONST. art. 55. 
 268. Ukr. Civ. Code arts. 440–441. 
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and care of data. If the private controller does not comply, the individual 
may demand its compliance in court.  
C. Cost of Transition for Balancing 
1. Benefits of Transition for Balancing the Interest in Data Protection 
Against the Interest in Free Flow of Information 
Finally, in terms of balancing, adopting a European-style statute 
incorporating aspects of U.S. data protection seems most suitable for 
helping Ukraine integrate into the EEC and EU. The statute will allow 
establishment of European-style defaults in favor of data protection, and 
exceptions in favor of freedom of information. Consequently, flow of data 
between Ukraine and the EU will simplify and encourage development of 
business cooperation. 
This harmonization of international approaches is beneficial not only 
for Ukraine’s prospects of internet business with more remote countries, 
such as Germany, Italy, or France, but also the smaller scale transactions 
with Ukraine’s traditional partners in trade and travel—Poland, Hungary, 
Slovakia, and other immediate neighbors that have recently joined the EU. 
The General Directive specifically proscribes that “transfer to a third 
country of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended 
for processing after transfer may take place only if . . . the third country in 
question ensures an adequate level of protection.”269 Because the EU is not 
only Ukraine’s close neighbor, but also one of the largest markets for 
goods and services worldwide,270 restrictions on business with the EU may 
disadvantage considerably Ukraine’s developing economy. 
2. Costs of Transition for the Balancing of Interests in Data Protection 
Against the Interests in the Free Flow of Information 
The cost of initiating European-style balancing requires that defaults 
and exceptions, even if textually similar to the European statute, be 
interpreted and applied in the same way by the institutions. Ukraine’s 
institutions come from a very different cultural and historical legacy then 
do the EU institutions. Comparing European and American balancing 
shows that the adoption of an omnibus data protection statute tends to shift 
defaults away from freedom of information. The European policy has been 
 269. General Directive, supra note 111, art. 25. 
 270. KUNER, supra note 104, at 1. 
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criticized for providing too much data protection, although for several 
generations the European culture was bred to recognize freedom of speech 
as a fundamental human right. By contrast, Ukraine comes from a culture 
without a similar history regarding freedom of speech. 
Liberal Ukrainian commentators contend that transplanting a legal idea 
from one society to a society with a less developed moral background not 
only may fail to work, but may have an adverse effect.271 It may be easier 
to change the written rules than the attitudes of those who interpret and 
apply them.272 Such attitudes shape institutions, as they are “humanly-
devised constraints that structure human interaction,”273 without which the 
legal systems cannot function on the basis of legal rules alone.274 
Can Ukraine internalize the cost of transition to new legal rules and 
also to institutional attitudes toward their application? Recent experience 
indicates that the institutional legacy can use new legal developments to 
advance old practices. 
An introduction of the “moral harm” doctrine to the civil law presents a 
good illustration of this allegation. Ukraine’s 1992 Law on Information 
allowed individuals to seek redress for interference with their right to 
access or disclose information by filing for damages in a civil suit.275 Until 
1993, the Civil Code’s definition of damages incorporated only actual 
damages and forgone profits.276 Consequently, under the Law on 
Information, to collect damages for the interference with right to access or 
disclose information, one needed to present considerable proof; this made 
remedy nearly impossible. 
In 1993, the legislature amended the Ukranian Civil Code adding the 
moral harm provision, which allowed for the filing of damages for mental 
suffering.277 It is difficult to say whether this provision has ever been used 
to promote an individual’s right to information. Neither the press nor 
statistics provide any proof to this effect. However, evidence that public 
officials use this new democratic concept to suppress freedom of speech is 
now widely known and discussed. Officials turned the moral harm concept 
 271. GIPI, supra note 241. 
 272. Schauer, supra note 227, at 272. 
 273. Douglass C. North, The New Institutional Economics and Development 5 (Washington 
University in St. Louis, working paper Sept. 8, 1993), available at http://econwpa.wustl.edu:8089/ 
epseh/papers/9309/9309002.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2004). 
 274. Stephen J. Toope, Legal and Judicial Reform through Development Assistance: Some 
Lessons, 48 MCGILL L.J. 357, 371 (2003). 
 275. Law on Information, supra note 30, arts. 48, 49. 
 276. KRASAVCHIKOV, supra note 91, at 423. 
 277. Ukr. Civ. Code arts. 440–444. 
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into a mechanism limiting freedom of information by filing defamation 
suits against the media criticizing its conduct. 
Some of the awards that officials obtained from the courts are dramatic 
even by western standards. For example, a member of a city council 
obtained a judgment for over 143,000 USD when local media publicized 
facts from his prior criminal past.278 In an even more prominent case, 
Minister of the Interior, Y. Kravchenko, obtained a judgment for over 2.5 
million USD from a newspaper that had accused him of abusing his 
office.279 Such developments astonished the European human rights world 
with reversal of the legal norm. In the eyes of the Council of Europe, 
defamation suits became an impermissible constraint on the freedom of 
information. In 2001, the Monitoring Commission of the Parliamentary 
Assembly even considered excluding Ukraine from the Council.280  
It took years of lobbying by local interest groups, coupled with threats 
by the international community, to convince the legislation to balance this 
accidental anti-democratic shift. In April 2003, the Parliament finally 
adopted the Law on Amendment of Some Legislative Acts of the Ukraine 
on Issues of Ensuring an Unimpeded Realization of a Human Right to 
Freedom of Speech.281 This statute provided that “[a] person shall be 
released from liability for dissemination of information with restricted 
access (e.g., personal data) if the court establishes that this information is 
socially important.”282 This provision, along with several others, may help 
to strike a better balance between privacy and information rights in today’s 
Ukraine.  
However, there is still a strong cultural tendency to restrict private 
actors’ liberty to publish and acquire information. For example, the 2004 
Civil Code dedicates only one article to the right to information,283 but 
commits at least ten articles to privacy.284 Moreover, the articles on 
privacy are quite strict. For example, according to the Code, in order to 
 278. KHRG, supra note 35, at 19. 
 279. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Ukraine Negotiating the News: Informal State Censorship of 
Ukrainian Television, No. 2(D) at 11 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ 
ukraine0303/Ukraine0303.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2006). 
 280. EUR. PARL. ASS., ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE FUNCTIONING OF PARLIAMENTARY 
DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE, RECOMMENDATION 1497 (Jan. 25, 2001). 
 281. Zakon Ukrajiny pro Vnesenn’a Zmin do Dejakykh Zakonodavchykh Active Ukrajiny z 
Pytan’ Zabezpechenn’a ta Bezpereshkodnoji Realizatsiji Prava L’udyny na Svobodu Slova [Law of 
Ukraine on Amendment of Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Issues of Ensuring and Unimpeded 
Realization of a Human Right to Freedom of Speech] #676-IV (Apr. 3, 2003) (author’s trans.) (on file 
with author). 
 282. Id. § 2 (1). 
 283. Ukr. Civ. Code art. 302. 
 284. Id. arts. 286, 294–96, 299, 301–03, 306–08. 
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publish a correspondence, one must obtain consent from the addressor, the 
addressee, and from all third persons mentioned by name in the 
correspondence.285 A new law on data protection under such 
circumstances is likely to cause a further shift away from freedom of 
information.  
A bill currently in Parliament supports the existence of this threat to 
freedom of information. The bill not only prohibits the collection of 
personal data without consent, but also requires that the consent be in 
writing.286 The drafters attempt to strike a balance in favor of freedom of 
information, but their attempt seems weak. Unlike the EU General 
Directive, which is structured to provide detailed exceptions immediately 
following each restriction, the Ukrainian lawmakers suggest a single 
general phrase at the end. The lawmakers propose that the right to privacy 
of personal data may be restricted “in the interest of . . . national, 
economical, and public safety or for . . . protection of human rights.”287 
Unlike the European system, the Ukrainian bill does not privilege 
journalists, direct marketers, or any other business professionals closely 
connected with processing personal data.288 Although harmonization with 
European legislation is cited as a primary justification for promoting the 
bill,289 interest groups already have expressed significant concern that the 
bill is merely a restriction of the right to self-expression.290  
Ukraine’s deeply entrenched Soviet legacy may turn a new data 
protection statute into a modernized tool for suppressing, rather than 
balancing, freedom of speech. Perhaps the Ukrainian cultural tradition is 
closer to European socialism than to American capitalism. This tradition 
likely makes both data subjects and data controllers more comfortable 
with centralized governmental regulation than with a dispersed industry-
standard setting. However, this potential comfort with governmental 
regulation is the very factor that presents a threat. In order to ensure the 
effectiveness of a data protection statute, Ukraine will need to restructure 
its institutional framework to provide better safeguards for fair creation 
 285. Id. art. 306. 
 286. Bill on Data Protection, supra note 92, art. 5. 
 287. Id. art. 29. 
 288. GIPI, supra note 241. 
 289. M. Scherbat’uk, Komentar do Zakonoproektu “Pro Zakhyst Personal’nykh Danykh” [A 
Comment on the Draft Law On Protection of Personal Data], http://ilaw.org.ua/comments_bill. 
php?id=12 (last visited Jan. 24, 2006) (author’s trans.) [hereinafter Scherbat’uk]. 
 290. See id.; see also Kashpur, supra note 257; and T. Shevchenko, U Rozrizi Dyskusiji navkolo 
Proektu Zakonu Ukrajiny “Pro Zakhyst Personal’nykh Danykh” [In Context of Discussion Around 
Draft Law of Ukraine on Protection of Personal Data], available at http://ilaw.org.ua/comments_ 
bill.php?id=12 (last visited Jan. 24, 2006) (author’s trans.). 
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and interpretation of the law. This cost of transition is high. In the 
meantime, if Ukraine does not want to pay it, will the European be 
affected? Can the lack of a data protection statute lead to a loss of business 
with the European Union? 
3. Costs of Non-Transition for the Balancing of the Interest in Data 
Protection Against the Interest in Free Flow of Information 
A closer look into the nature of business restrictions potentially derived 
from inadequate data protection proves that the risk is negligible. Formal 
accession of Ukraine to the EU is unlikely to occur in the near future. For 
advancement of informal integration—the boosting of flow of goods, 
services, people, and capital—there is no guarantee that the statute will 
make a difference. 
In determining the adequacy of the data protection system in each 
country, the European authorities give great deference not only to the 
written law, but also to procedural and enforcement mechanisms including 
ensuring a good level of compliance with the rules, providing support and 
help to individual data subjects in the exercise of their rights, and 
providing appropriate redress to injured parties when rules are violated.291 
According to the EU, the countries with Adequacy Status regarding data 
protection currently are limited to Switzerland, Canada, Argentina, and 
Guernsey. The U.S. system is deemed adequate only insofar as a transfer 
of data is covered by a Safe Harbor or a Passenger Air Transfer 
Agreement.292 Even if Ukraine invests all of its political power into an 
attempt to achieve EU Adequacy Status, the process will take the EU at 
least a few years.293  
In addition to being extremely difficult to achieve, Adequacy Status 
likely will bring no special advantages. A negligible number of European 
businesses today export data outside the EU. European Commission 
surveys prove that only one in ten companies transfers personal data 
outside the EU or the European Economic Area (EEA).294 Even if the need 
for transborder data flow becomes more important in future partnerships, 
there are a number of ways to secure adequate protection of the EU-
originated data in Ukraine even in the absence of comprehensive 
 291. KUNER, supra note 104, at 134. 
 292. See EUROPA, Justice and Home Affairs—Data Protection, Commission Decisions on the 
Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in Third Countries, http:/europa.eu.int/comm/ 
justic_home/fsj/privacy/thridcountries/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2006). 
 293. KUNER, supra note 104, at 136. 
 294. Eurobarometer, supra note 139, at 5. 
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legislation. Recognizing the need to promote transborder data flows, the 
General Directive sets forth several alternatives, including model contract 
clauses, adequate safeguards in particular ad hoc contracts, codes of 
conduct, and others.295 Finally, while development of business relations 
with the EU hardly depends greatly on the adoption of a data protection 
statute, business relations with the United States likely would suffer from 
such adoption, discouraging laissez-faire oriented U.S. companies from 
seeking the Ukrainian market.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Under Soviet rule, it was believed that time would lessen the need for 
laws. The fall of the Soviet Union and the desire to enter the EU have 
strengthened the notion of rule of law in Ukraine. Accordingly, adoption 
of an omnibus statute for the legal system to address a novel data 
protection problem appears to offer the most appropriate solution for 
Ukraine. As the European experience suggests, a statute could establish 
data protection as an important social value, articulate data processing 
rules, and fairly balance the competing interests of privacy and free flow 
of information. However, a statute alone does not guarantee enforced law. 
In a society with no legacy of democratic institutions, where no demand 
yet exists for such law, and which lacks basic enforcement resources, the 
cost of creating an effective law will be high. Unable to pay this cost, the 
nation may simply reframe Soviet-style censorship into a new human-
rights-shaped mold. 
In light of Ukraine’s social history and goal of entering the EU, the 
U.S. model may be unsuitable for the country to follow in the long term. 
However, for the short term, self-regulation in Ukraine can provide a safe 
harbor against revolutionary change. It can channel an under resourced 
governmental effort into, more urgent areas of building a democracy, such 
as fostering maturation of demand for information privacy, and helping 
data-processing businesses rise to their feet. Self-regulation will encourage 
businesses in Ukraine to learn directly from newly-acquired western 
partners the most appropriate practices of data processing. Private 
experience will fertilize the soil for planting a viable statute, if needed, 
when the time comes. 
 295. KUNER, supra note 104, at 124. 
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